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 1 
Summary 
The relationship between the Union legal order and the national 
constitutions of its Member States is a complex one, caused mostly due to 
the sui generis nature of the European Union. EU-27 inevitably means that 
the Union stands on 27 different national constitutions, each with its own 
constitutional specificities. Article 4.2 TEU, stating that the Union shall 
respect the national identities of the Member States, nevertheless has the 
potential to accommodate those specificities within the Union legal order. 
Article 4.2 TEU, in this paper referred to as the national identity clause, is 
however covered in a layer of mystery. Its elusive character stems from a 
range of varying questions. What is the exact definition of a national 
identity, what is the legal relevance of the national identity clause, and how 
should it be applied? This paper focuses on the last question. As such, the 
paper stands on the thesis that Article 4.2 TEU should be seen as a flexibility 
clause granting Member States a margin of appreciation.  
 
In that light, it is argued that Article 4.2 TEU as a flexibility clause finds its 
legal context within the notion of constitutional pluralism, as well as within 
the principles of subsidiarity and conferral.  
 
Although the proposition of linking the national identity clause with the 
margin of appreciation can be interpreted from existing case-law, the legal 
implication of their coexistence is uncharted territory. Seemingly, Article 
4.2 TEU seen as a flexibility clause would imply two things. First, it would 
alter the proportionality test applicable in cases related to the national 
identity clause, presumably by creating a more lenient test. Second, the 
margin of appreciation may manifest itself by inviting the ECJ to preferably 
give guidance judgments rather than ready-made solutions, giving national 
courts a sort of “right to assessment”.  
 
Additionally, the connection between the margin of appreciation and the 
national identity clause begs the question of whether the identity clause is a 
codified and amplified public policy derogation, or a freestanding clause for 
derogation. As the two most famous cases on Article 4.2 TEU, Omega and 
Sayn-Wittgenstein, primarily are linked to public policy, the legal weight of 
the identity clause may be questioned. Its legal value might however also be 
questioned if compared to the principle of primacy. While the significance 
of national identities cannot be underestimated, the ECJ, in the recent case 
Melloni, nevertheless stressed the importance of not jeopardizing the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.  
 
In conclusion, although Article 4.2 TEU seen as a flexibility clause answers 
the question on how to reconcile national constitutional specificities with 
Union law, it primarily generates more questions than answers. Hence, the 
elusive character of the national identity clause remains.  
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Sammanfattning 
Förhållandet mellan unionens rättsordning och medlemstaternas nationella 
konstitutioner är komplicerad, främst på grund av EU:s unika karaktär. EU-
27 innebär oundvikligen att unionen står på 27 olika nationella 
konstitutioner, alla med sina egna konstitutionella särdrag. Artikel 4.2 i EU-
fördraget (hädanefter ”EUF”), som stadgar att unionen skall respektera 
medlemstaternas nationella identiteter, har dock potentialen att tillgodose 
dessa särdrag inom unionens rättsordning. Artikel 4.2 EUF, här kallad den 
nationella identitetsklausulen, är dock täckt av ett lager av mystik. Dess 
undflyende karaktär härstammar från en rad olika frågor. Vad är 
definitionen av en nationell identitet, vad är den rättsliga betydelsen av den 
nationella identitetsklausulen och hur ska den tillämpas? Detta arbete 
fokuserar på den sista frågan. Dess tes är att artikel 4.2 EUF bör ses som en 
flexibilitetsklausul som ger medlemsstaterna ett utrymme för skönsmässig 
bedömning. 
 
Mot den bakgrunden, argumenteras här att artikel 4.2 EUF som en 
flexibilitetsklausul finner sitt rättsliga sammanhang inom begreppet 
konstitutionell pluralism samt subsidiaritetsprincipen och principen om 
tilldelade befogenheter.  
 
Även om förslaget att koppla den nationella identitetsklausulen med 
doktrinen om ett utrymme för skönsmässig bedömning kan tolkas från 
befintlig rättspraxis, är den rättsliga konsekvensen av deras samexistens 
okänd mark. Till synes skulle artikel 4.2 EUF som en flexibilitetsklausul 
innebära två saker. För det första skulle den ändra proportionalitetstestets 
tillämpning på fall som rör den nationella identitetsklausulen, förmodligen 
genom att skapa ett mildare test. För det andra skulle förslaget bjuda in 
EU-domstolen till att ge vägledande domar snarare än färdiga lösningar. 
 
Därutöver väcker kopplingen mellan ett utrymme för skönsmässig 
bedömning och den nationella identitetsklausulen frågan om 
identitetsklausulen är en kodifierad och förstärkt grund för ordre public eller 
en fristående klausul. Eftersom de två mest kända fallen gällande artikel 4.2 
EUF, Omega och Sayn-Wittgenstein, i första hand är kopplade till ordre 
public, kan identitetsklausulens juridiska tyngd ifrågasättas. Dess rättsliga 
värde kan dock även ifrågasättas om granskad mot principen om EU-rättens 
företräde. Även om betydelsen av nationella identiteter inte kan 
underskattas, har EU-domstolen, i det nyligen avgjorda fallet Melloni, 
betonat vikten av att inte äventyra EU-rättens företräde, enhetlighet och 
verkan. 
 
Sammantaget, även om artikel 4.2 EUF sedd som en flexibilitetsklausul 
svarar på frågan om hur man kan förena nationella konstitutionella särdrag 
med unionsrätten, genererar den främst fler frågor än svar. Den nationella 
identitetsklausulen undflyende karaktär kvarstår således. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
United In Diversity
1
 
 
In 2004 ten new Member States joined the European Union (EU). Following 
this, Bulgaria and Romania acceded in 2007, adding up to a total number of 
27 Member States.
2
 EU-27
3
 means 27 legal traditions, 27 cultural heritages, 
27 historic backgrounds, 27 constitutions and ultimately 27 national 
identities. The motto of the EU “United in diversity” accurately illustrates 
this sui generis nature of the Union. It also underlines the potential and 
importance of Article 4.2 Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in this 
paper also called the national identity clause.  
 
The identity clause has been given a novel formulation in the Lisbon treaty, 
raising a lot of debate concerning its legal implications. Article 4.2 TEU 
states that the Union shall respect the national identities of the Member 
States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional. 
However, although the national identity clause is of central significance in 
the Union legal order, it is a notion covered by mystery. One of the more 
debated issues surrounding the clause is its definition. The focus of this 
paper is however not to elucidate the definition and meaning of national 
identities. Rather, it goes one step further and examines its application and 
function, as to determine its legal implications as a tool for judicial review.  
 
Collisions between national constitutional provisions and EU law have 
appeared in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with regular 
intervals, and one might guess that, if anything, the prevalence of such 
collisions will increase. It is against this background that Article 4.2 TEU, 
stating that the Union must respect the national identities of its Member 
States, serves its purpose. If understood as a flexibility clause, granting 
Member States a margin of appreciation as to reunite their constitutional 
specificities with the objectives of the Union, any future collisions might 
strengthen the Union rather than weaken it.  
1.2 Aim and Research Questions 
While this paper will try to cover all the main aspects surrounding the 
national identity clause, its focus lies in examining the identity clause´s 
function within the application of the ECJ. As such, the paper is based on 
the thesis that Article 4.2 TEU should be seen as a flexibility clause granting 
Member States a margin of appreciation. In pursuing this thesis, the paper is 
                                               
1 Motto of the European Union. 
2 Croatia is moreover expected to accede 1 July 2013.  
3 The EU has 27 Member States.  
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faced with a handful of important questions related to the national identity 
clause and its possible function within the Union legal order. These are, in 
the order they are discussed under Chapter 5: 
 
 What is the relationship between Article 4.2 TEU seen as a 
flexibility clause and the notion of constitutional pluralism? 
 What is the relationship between Article 4.2 TEU seen as a 
flexibility clause and the principle of subsidiarity? 
 What is the relationship between Article 4.2 TEU seen as a 
flexibility clause and the principle of conferral?  
 How would the margin of appreciation doctrine function within the 
national identity clause? What would be the effect of such a 
relationship? 
 Is, and if yes how is, the justification of public policy, which often 
goes hand in hand with a margin of appreciation, linked with the 
national identity clause? 
 What would be the consequences of seeing Article 4.2 TEU as a 
flexibility clause in relation to the primacy of EU law? 
 
The purpose of the paper is consequently to elucidate the nebulous 
application of the national identity clause. It thus tries to bring some clarity 
in how Article 4.2 TEU can be used to ease the tension between Union law 
and the constitutional specificities of the Member States. 
1.3 Method and Materials 
First and foremost, it should be noted that this is an argumentative paper, as 
it stands on a specific thesis. Hence, while chapter 2 to 4 goes through the 
different aspects of the national identity clause and the issues surrounding it, 
chapter 5 turns to the argumentative part of the paper. Therefore, chapter 5 
is not in its true sense an analysis. Rather, it builds on the factual 
information given in the previous chapters to support the thesis.  
 
The method used in this paper is that of a traditional legal dogmatic 
approach. The paper therefore stands on, and is analyzed in light of, 
recognized legal sources. In particular case-law and academic journals have 
been used.  
 
Special attention has to be drawn to the fact that while case-law on Article 
4.2 TEU is limited, there is a vast amount of doctrine on the subject. Hence, 
the paper primarily stands on the contribution made by academic scholars in 
various legal journals. Well renowned journals has consistently been tried to 
be used. Hence, while some authors might not be well-known, the journal in 
which their article is published speaks for them. While EU legal doctrine 
has no formal status as a legal source and is not quoted by the ECJ, it does 
not have an insignificant role as regards the further development of EU-
 7 
law.
4
 It is for instance frequently cited and discussed by Advocates General 
in their opinions.  
 
The fact that case-law on the national identity clause is scarce is an 
inevitable weakness, since no general conclusions may be drawn. This does 
on the other hand not imply that it is futile to examine Article 4.2 TEU. On 
the contrary, the scarce case-law on Article 4.2 TEU is one of the reasons 
why it is interesting to analyze.  
1.4 Delimitations  
As stated, this paper focuses on the application and function of 
Article 4.2 TEU, and hence only discusses the possible definition of national 
identities in brief. Academic scholars have since the appearance of the 
national identity clause been in disagreement as regards the definition of 
national identities, the main aspect being whether cultural identities also is 
covered. The diverging opinions have continued even after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon treaty, although Article 4.2 TEU specifically draws a 
link to constitutional identities. While the paper under section 3.5 tries to 
give an overview on the definition of national identities, it does not do 
justice to all the diverging opinions on the matter.  
 
Article 4.2 TEU states “inherent in their fundamental structures, political 
and constitutional” (emphasis added). The political aspect of national 
identities has until now been neglected in academic doctrine and the case-
law of the ECJ. It is however an interesting aspect of Article 4.2 TEU. 
Presumably, political identity is not to be considered as interchangeable 
with constitutional identity as such a reading would make the meaning of 
having both words in the article void. It might be argued that while 
constitutional identity focuses on the essential constitutional structures of 
the state, political identity rather focuses on the essential political 
characteristics of the state. The Swedish labour market model 
(arbetsmarknadsmodellen), where for instance labour unions have a strong 
position on the market, might be such an example. This obviously leads 
one’s thoughts to Laval.5 The Swedish government did however not explore 
this possibility. Though an interesting part of the national identity clause, 
this strain of political identity has regretfully not been included in this paper 
as the focus is its function and application and not its definition.  
 
The recent Grand Chamber case Åkerberg raises an interesting question as 
regards the connection between national identities and fundamental rights, 
and their coexistence with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Charter). The ECJ noted that the Member States “remain 
free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, 
provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, [...], and 
the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby 
                                               
4 Lehrberg, Bert, Praktisk Juridisk Metod, 5.ed, IBA, 2006, p. 180. 
5 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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compromised.”6 As this however falls outside the scope of this paper, it has 
not been addressed.  
 
Article 4.2 TEU has to be seen from two perspectives, that of the Union, and 
that of the Member States. The paper however focuses on the application 
and function of the national identity clause by the ECJ. Hence, the Member 
State perspective of the identity clause is not given the same amount of 
attention as the Union perspective. The paper for instance only addresses the 
views of the Conseil Constitutionnel, French constitutional court, and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Federal constitutional court of Germany, on the 
matter.  
 
The wealth of case-law and academic commentary on the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is as good of an indication as any on the variety of 
broad connotations existing as regards the doctrine. Consequently, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
doctrine. As the focus is on Article 4.2 TEU, the paper only describes the 
doctrine in more general terms. The same applies as regards the theory of 
constitutional pluralism.  
1.5 Disposition and Terminology 
The paper is divided into four different chapters, each building upon the 
other.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between EU law and the legal orders of 
the Member States. As such, it is devoted to a general overview of the most 
essential principles of the Union: the principle of conferral, the principle of 
proportionality, the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of primacy. 
The chapter also addresses the issue of whether the Union has judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
 
Chapter 3 turns to Article 4.2 TEU, the national identity clause, and gives a 
thorough examination of the article as regards its legal context, the case-law 
related to it and its function within the Union legal order.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the margin of appreciation as used both by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the ECJ. 
 
Chapter 5 turns to the thesis of the paper and discusses it in light of the 
previous chapters. In essence, Article 4.2 TEU understood as a flexibility 
clause is analyzed in relation to the notion of constitutional pluralism, the 
principle of subsidiarity, the principle of conferral, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, public policy and the principle of primacy. The paper 
then ends with a conclusion on chapter five.  
 
                                               
6 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg [2013] n.y.r., para. 29.  
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As regards the terminology used in this paper, one thing in particular has to 
be highlighted. The heart of the paper, Article 4.2 TEU, will 
interchangeably be referred to as the “national identity clause”, “identity 
clause”, “clause” and “Article 4.2 TEU” throughout the paper.   
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine, primarily goes under two names. 
Within the European Convention on Human Rights and international law, it 
is referred to as the margin of appreciation. Within EU law, it is usually 
referred to as the margin of discretion. The ECJ has however sometimes 
also referred to a margin of appreciation. This paper consistently uses the 
term “margin of appreciation”, except under section 4.3, as the doctrine per 
se, commonly is known under this name. The term margin of appreciation 
has furthermore been used as to highlight the argued connection between the 
doctrine and the national identity clause.  
 10 
2 The Relationship Between EU 
Law and the Legal Orders of 
the Member States 
2.1 Introduction 
Much has changed since the first steps towards a European union were taken 
in the 1950s. The days when the Union was thought of as a mere 
economical union are long gone. Fundamental rights, once located in the 
backseat, have now transformed into one of the central pillars of the Union, 
as seen by the ratification of the Charter.
7
 Yet, many central issues remain 
the same, to a large extent due to the sui generis nature of the EU. The 
division of competences between the Union and its Member States has since 
the beginning caused headaches for policy makers, scholars and ultimately 
the ECJ and national courts. Where are the boundaries of EU law, and who 
decides?  
 
The principle of conferral and the principle of primacy both form part of the 
Union’s spine.8 Nevertheless, there is an evident tension between the two 
principles, the former providing the limits for the Union’s competences and 
the latter setting the powers within those limits limitless. It is within this 
context that the notion of national identities might be understood, standing 
as the last safe house within the limitless reach of the principle of primacy. 
As the national autonomy of the Member States narrows, the national 
individualities of the Member States become more vital.  
 
This chapter will touch upon the principle of conferral and clarify the issues 
surrounding it (section 2.2). It will then turn to the principle of primacy, and 
ultimately the vivid debate between the EU and its Member States 
concerning who the final arbiter over the limits of the Union is (section 
2.3).
9
 
  
                                               
7
 See, Cartabia, Marta, “Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously”, ECLRev., Vol. 5, 
2009. 
8 A sort of EU identity.  
9 For an in-depth analysis of this debate see; Beck, Gunnar, “The Lisbon Judgment of the 
German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz: A Conﬂict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor”, ELRev 
Vol 17, No. 4, 2011, p. 471; Kwiecién, Roman, “The Primacy of European Union Law over 
National Law Under the Constitutional Treaty”, German Law Journal, Vol. 6, 2005, 
pp. 1479 – 1496; Craig, Paul, “The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis”, 
CMLRev., Vol. 48, 2011, pp. 395-437 and Kumm, Mattias, Who is The Final Arbiter of 
Constitutionality in Europe?: “Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German 
Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice”, CMLRev., Vol. 36, 1999, 
pp. 351 – 386. 
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2.2 The Competence of the European 
Union  
2.2.1 The Principle of Conferral and 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
As stated in Article 5.2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by its Member States, otherwise known as the principle of 
conferral. Hence, the Union has an attributed competence and cannot grant 
itself new competences. In accordance with the principle of conferral, 
competences not conferred upon the Union remain with the Member 
States.
10
 All Union action must be founded upon a legal base within the 
Treaties. Any action outside the limits of the Union’s competences is thus 
considered ultra vires. In other words, the principle of conferral stakes out 
the division of competences between the Union and the Member States and 
is as such of utter importance, which is also shown by its numerous 
appearance in the opening articles of the Treaties.
11
 
 
While the principle of conferral sets up the division of competences between 
the Union and the Member States, the question of who gets to decide the 
boundaries for that division is, and has always been, a hot potato discussed 
by policy makers, numerous scholars, the ECJ and the national 
constitutional courts of the Member States.
12
 In essence, it is a question of 
whether the ECJ, based on the authority granted to it by the Treaties and the 
aim to have a uniform application of Union law, or the national 
constitutional courts, based on the principle of conferral and their national 
constitutions, has the final word. It is a debate of whether the Union has 
what the Germans refer to as judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e whether the 
Union has the authority to decide the limits of its own powers.
13
 This should 
be distinguished from legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e. whether the 
Union has the competence to legislate in a certain area.
14
  
 
The ECJ has answered the question on judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz in its 
own favor. In Foto-Frost the court claimed the exclusive right to invalidate 
Union acts and thus, as many perceive it, announced itself as the final 
arbiter on the limits of EU law.
15
 However, the constitutional courts of 
                                               
10 Article 4.1 TEU 
11 See reference to the principle in Article 3.6, 4:1, 5:1 and 5:2 TEU and Article 7 TFEU.  
12 See note 10. 
13 Beck, Gunnar, “The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy 
of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conﬂict between Right and 
Right in Which There is No Praetor”, ELRev., Vol. 17, No. 4, 2011, p. 472 
14
 The Union and ECJ can for instance have the judicial competence but not the legislative 
competence on a certain matter. See for instance Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd 
[2007] ECR I-11767, on the right to strike. 
15 Beck, Gunnar, “The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy 
of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conﬂict between Right and 
Right in Which There is No Praetor”, ELRev., Vol. 17, No. 4, 2011, p. 473 and Weiler, 
 12 
several Member States, most notably the FCC (the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht), have consistently made clear that they do not 
agree with the view of the ECJ in this matter.
16
 A closer look into the 
principle of primacy and the tension between the ECJ and the national 
constitutional courts will follow in section 2.3.2. 
 
Alongside the principle of conferral, the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity also govern the exercise of the competences conferred upon the 
Union.
17
  
2.2.1.1 The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality stands out as one of the most important 
tools of judicial review used by the ECJ. As observed by Advocate General 
Jacobs “there are few areas of Community law, if any at all, where [it] is not 
relevant.”18 The principle has mainly two purposes; controlling the extent to 
which Union institutions are permitted to act, and limiting the margin 
Member States are given when derogating from Union law.
19
 The former 
stems directly from Article 5.4 TEU: “Under the principle of 
proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what 
is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”20 Hence, all Union 
institutions are bound by the principle of proportionality, and any act may 
be annulled if not in compliance with it.
21
 As a general principle of EU law, 
the principle of proportionality is also essential in determining whether a 
Member State derogating from Union law has done so striking a proper 
balance between the means used and the intended aim.
22
  
 
The principle of proportionality under EU law entails two tests. First, the 
means employed must be suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired 
objective (test of suitability). Second, the means cannot go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve that objective (test of necessity).
23
 In the words of the 
ECJ, national measures liable to hinder a fundamental freedom must be 
“suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and 
[...] not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”24 It has been 
argued that the test in reality consists of three steps, the third one being the 
test of proportionality strict sensu, which means that a measure may not 
                                                                                                                       
Joseph, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” And other 
essays on European integration, 1999, Cambridge University Press, p. 288. 
16 See section 2.3.2. 
17 Article 4:1 TEU 
18 Case C-120/94 Commission v. Greece (FYROM case) [1996] ECR I-1513, para. 70. 
19 Dashwood, Alan et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union law, 6th ed., 2011, Hart 
Publishing, p. 122.  
20 Article 5.4 TEU. 
21 Eg. Case C-380/03 Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising II) [2006] 
ECR I-11573; and Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich [2013]  n.y.r., where the ECJ however did 
not find the contested Union acts disproportionate. 
22 Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed., 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 141 
23 Dashwood, Alan et al. Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union law, 6th ed., 2011, Hart 
Publishing, p. 123. 
24 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, para. 37.  
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have an excessive effect on the applicant’s interests.25 This is for instance 
the case in the recent Grand Chamber case Sky Österreich.
26
 
2.2.1.2 The Principle of Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity in Article 5.3 TEU requires that the Union, in 
areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, only act if the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States. This is for instance the case if a proposed action, by reason 
of its scale or effects, is better achieved at Union level. The basic idea 
behind the principle is hence that public decisions should be taken at the 
lowest tier of government capable of addressing the matter in question. 
Even if the Union has the competence to act, it may, consequently, only do 
so if the principle of subsidiarity so allows. The principle was introduced in 
the Maastricht Treaty as a response to the dissatisfaction in many Member 
States of the expanding scope of the Union and the way it was exercising its 
powers.
27
  
 
The application of the principle falls primarily on the Union institutions that 
need to comply with the principle when acting under the Treaties. With the 
Lisbon treaty, the national parliaments were however also given a major 
responsibility in ensuring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The 
new Protocol on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
28
 
introduced a new system under which the parliaments may control Union 
acts in light of the principle of subsidiarity. The principle is also a tool for 
judicial review used by the ECJ in examining the validity of Union acts.
29
  
The impact of the principle in case-law has, however, in practice been 
modest. Though the court on several occasions has reviewed Union acts 
against the principle, it has yet not annulled any act on that ground. This is 
because Union actions logically are measured against Union objectives. 
Hence, it is logical that any Union act will be better achieved at Union 
level.
30
 
2.2.2 The Functional Competence of the Union  
While the Union must act within the powers conferred upon it by the 
Treaties, the practical significance of the principle of conferral is diminished 
by several factors. Underpinning these factors is the functional approach of 
the competences bestowed on the Union. The competences of the Union are 
namely functional, as opposed to sectorial. Simply put, the competences are 
                                               
25 Tridimas, Takis, The General Principles of EC law, 1999, Oxford, p. 92. 
26 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich [2013]  n.y.r. para. 63. 
27 Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed., 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 131 
28 Protocol (No. 2), annexed to the TEU and TFEU, on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, 2010, O.J. C83/206. 
29 Eg. Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2001] ECR I-11453, paras 180-183.  
30 Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed., 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 137. 
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not divided up according to subject-matter but functionally in that they are 
based on aims.
31
  
 
In light of this functional characteristic of Union competences, the principle 
of conferral has in practice placed few limits on the Union. This is what 
scholars call the “competence creep” of EU law.32 Commonly, this 
occurrence is explained by two factors;
33
 the teleological interpretation the 
ECJ has given to various legal bases, as well as the broad and the somewhat 
vague wording of many Treaty articles. Article 352 TFEU, providing the 
Union with a supplementary legal basis when the Treaties do not provide 
the necessary powers to attain the objectives of the Union, is a common 
example of the latter.
34
 If the discussion about Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
concerns who gets to decide the limits of the Union’s competences, the issue 
of competence creep is thus a question on how far those limits have 
expanded. 
 
The functional character of the Union’s competences and the existence of a 
competence creep has given rise to a vivid debate over how the attributed 
competences of the Union should be shaped. A more precise division of 
competences between the Union and the Member States has thus been called 
for.
35
 This debate was not neglected when forming the Lisbon treaty, which 
in part responded to the call by introducing a clear definition of the Union’s 
competences in Article 2 TFEU. At the same time it also added a list of the 
most important areas of competence, divided by category of competence, in 
Articles 3-6 TFEU.
 36
 
                                               
31 Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed., 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 106. 
32 See Prechal, Sacha, “Competence creep and general principles of law”, Rev. Eur. Adm. 
L., Vol. 3, No 1, 2010, p. 5 and Barnard, Catherine and Odudu, Okeoghene, “The Outer 
limits of European Law: Introduction”, in Barnard, Catherine and Odudu, Okeoghene, The 
outer limits of the European Union, 2009, Hart Publishing p. 1-16. 
33 See Craig, Paul, “The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis”, CMLRev., 
Vol. 48, 2011, pp. 395-437, arguing that the existence of a competence creep is the result of 
four interacting variables.  
34 Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed. 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 113  
35; Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed. 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 114; which in turn has made reference to Declaration (No. 23), annexed to the 
Treaty of Nice, ([2001] O.J. C80/85) and the “Declaration of Laeken of the European 
Council of December 14 and 15, 2001. 
36 Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed. 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 114 and 125. The list of competences can be found in Article 3 TFEU 
(exclusive competences), Article 4 TFEU (shared competences) and Article 6 (supporting 
competences). 
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2.3 The Principle of Primacy 
The principle of primacy, also referred to as the principle of supremacy,
37
 
has evolved through the case-law of the ECJ and is today considered as one 
of the central pillars in what can be called the constitutional sphere of the 
Union.
38
 However, after more than 40 years alive and kicking, the debate 
over its limits and effects is still ongoing.
39
 The principle was enshrined in 
Article I-6 of the rejected Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, but 
wasdowngraded in the Treaty of Lisbon to the declarations concerning the 
provisions of the Treaties.
40
  
 
In essence, the principle of supremacy means that Union law takes 
precedence over national law. In case of conflict between the two legal 
systems, Union law prevails. And here lies the Gordian knot
41
, the obvious 
tension between the principle of conferral and the principle of primacy. At 
the same time as Union law precedes all national law due to the principle of 
primacy, it cannot extend further than the powers granted to the Union by 
the same national laws that the principle oversteps.
42
  
 
The Member States and their courts have, although not without some 
resistance, accepted the principle of primacy. However, the principle is still 
a cause for debate as regards the question of whether the Union has judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The national constitutional courts claim that the 
principle of supremacy stems from their constitutions. The ECJ on the other 
hand claims that the principle is inherent in the Union, due to the Union’s 
special and original nature.
43
  
 
The principle of primacy should be distinguished from the doctrine of pre-
emption. The doctrine of pre-emption refers to the situation that Member 
States cannot act where the Union has exclusive competence, or, within an 
area of shared competence, already has exercised that competence.
44
 
Depending on the extent to which the Union has exercised its competence, 
the area may thus be seen as an exclusive one.
 45
 
                                               
37 Some scholars argue that there is a conceptual difference between the two notions. 
Avbelj, Matej, “Supremacy or Primacy of EU law – (Why) Does it Matter?”, ELJ, Vol. 17, 
2011, pp. 744-763. In this paper the two notions are seen as synonyms.  
38 See Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] n.y.r. para. 59.  
39 Lenaerts, Koen, and Corthaut, Tim, “Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy in invoking 
norms of EU law”, ELRev., Vol. 31, No. 3, 2006, pp. 287-315. 
40 Declaration (No. 17), annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, concerning primacy, [2010] O.J. 
C/83/344. 
41 Ancient Greek legend of a disentangling knot ultimately solved by Alexander the Great 
by cutting trough it with a sword. Used to describe an unsolvable problem or an unsolvable 
problem that can only be solved by cheating.  
42 Beck, Gunnar, “The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy 
of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conﬂict between Right and 
Right in Which There is No Praetor”, ELRev. Vol. 17, No. 4, 2011, p. 470 
43 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
44 Article 4 TEU. 
45 See Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3 ed. 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 128 and Schütze, Robert, “Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly 
 16 
2.3.1 Evolution of the Principle of Primacy 
The story of the principle of primacy was born in 1964 with the case Costa v 
ENEL
46
, one of the landmark cases of the Union. The ECJ here for the first 
time articulated the principle that Union law takes precedence over national 
law. The court justified this decision by drawing inspiration from Van Gend 
en Loos
47
, recalling that the EEC Treaty had created its own legal system 
which became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States. It 
then referred to the danger in allowing Community law to vary from one 
Member State to another, hence jeopardizing the objectives of the Treaties. 
The ECJ concluded that: 
 
“the law stemming from the Treaty, [...], could not, because of its special 
and original nature, be overridden by domestic provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and 
without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into 
question.”48 
 
Six years later, in 1970, came Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,
49
 usually 
described as the case confirming the ECJ’s claim of absolute supremacy.50 
Faced with the issue regarding the relationship between Community 
secondary law and national constitutional law, the ECJ stated that: 
 
“the validity of a Community measure of its effect within a Member 
State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either 
fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the 
principles of a national constitutional structure.”51 
 
The ECJ reasoned that the uniform application and efficiency of Union law 
would be undermined if a national provision, irrespective of its status under 
that national legal order, could trump it.
52
  
 
What happens then to a national rule standing in direct contradiction with a 
Union act? This question was answered by the ECJ in Simmenthal II, where 
the court held that national rules infringing a Union act would render it 
automatically inapplicable.
53
 The ECJ further stated that the Member States 
are under a duty to both refrain from enacting national provisions contrary 
                                                                                                                       
emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption”, CMLRev., Vol. 43, 2006, pp. 1023-1048. It 
should be noted that this is a simplified explication of the doctrine.  
46 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
47 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1; where the ECJ established the direct effect 
of Union law.  
48 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
49 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
50 de Witte, Bruno, “Direct Effect, Primacy and The Nature of The Legal Order”, in Craig, 
Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne, The Evolution of EU Law, 2 ed., 2011, Oxford, p. 342; and 
Schütze, Robert, “Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly emergent doctrine of 
Community pre-emption”, CMLRev. Vol. 43, 2006, p. 1027. 
51 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para.3. 
52 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para.3. 
53 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
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to Union law and refrain from applying such laws.
54
 Thus, the principle of 
primacy does not invalidate inconsistent national rules, but merely requires 
the non-application of the rule within the context where it is inconsistent. In 
fully internal situations, or if the EU norm ceases to exist, the rule will be 
fully applicable.
55
 
 
While the Member States and its courts in general have accepted the 
principle of primacy, the primacy of EU law over national constitutions is a 
completely different matter.
56
 
2.3.2 The Response of the National 
Constitutional Courts 
The relationship between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts of 
the Member States is far from an easy one. It has even been compared to the 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine used during the Cold War.
57
 
Putting names aside, the relationship is in essence a dialogue between the 
courts where right stands against right
58
.  
 
As regards the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the ECJ asserts that 
the principle of primacy derives its powers from within the Union legal 
order and that EU law, because of its special and original nature, trumps the 
national constitutions of the Member States. If this holds true, the ECJ alone 
has the authority to set the limits of EU law. However, the national courts 
see themselves as the guardians of their own constitutional orders.
59
 As 
such, they consider EU law as rooted in and stemming from their own 
national constitutions. Consequently, the principle of supremacy derives 
from their constitutions, and not from an autonomous source of law within 
the Union legal order.
60
 Most constitutional courts have therefore reserved 
for themselves, although with different approaches, the residual right to be 
the final arbiter in reviewing the legality of EU acts.  
 
                                               
54 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para. 17. 
55 de Witte, Bruno, “Direct Effect, Primacy and The Nature of The Legal Order”, in Craig, 
Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne, The Evolution of EU Law, 2 ed., Oxford, 2011, p. 341 
56 de Witte, Bruno, “Direct Effect, Primacy and The Nature of The Legal Order”, in Craig, 
Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne, The Evolution of EU Law, 2ed, 2011, Oxford, p. 350. 
57
 Weiler, Joseph, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” 
And other essays on European integration, 1999, Cambridge University Press, pp. 320-321.  
58 Term used by Beck, Gunnar, “The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, 
the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conﬂict between 
Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor”, ELRev., Vol. 17, No. 4, 2011, pp. 470-494. 
59 Sweet, Alex Stone, “Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community”, in Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Alex Stone Sweet and Joseph H. H. Weiler, (eds.), The European Courts 
& National Court Doctrine and Jurisprudence, 1997, Hart Publishing, p. 319. 
60 de Witte, Bruno, Direct Effect, “Primacy and The Nature of The Legal Order”, in Craig, 
Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne, The Evolution of EU Law, 2ed, 2011, p. 351-352. The author 
however notes that the Netherlands may be an exception. See also: Hartely, The 
Foundations of European Union Law, 7th ed. 2010, Oxford, p. 284 
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For the sake of space, I will only address the reservations from the French 
and German constitutional courts.
61
  
2.3.2.1 The Conseil Constitutionnel62 
Although Article 55 of the French Constitution states that international 
treaties stand above any national law, the primacy of EU law over the 
French legal order is a far more complicated issue than Article 55 suggests. 
While the Cour de cassation acknowledged the primacy of EU law in 1975 
in the Cafés Vabre case,
63
 the Conseil d’Etat waited until 1989, in the 
Nicolo case, to accept the principle.
64
  
 
As to the Conseil Constitutionnel (CC), the court stated in a series of cases 
in 2004 that it was a constitutional obligation to transpose Community 
directives into domestic law. The court however added an exception to the 
obligation in case of an “express contrary provision of the Constitution.”65 
At the same time it made clear that the French constitution remained at the 
summit of the domestic legal order, thus standing above the principle of 
primacy.
66
 As regards the exception of an “express contrary provision”, this 
term remained ambiguous until 2007 when the court reformulated its 
reservation , stating that EU law prevails over national law except when in 
conflict with France’s constitutional identity.67 The effect of this reservation 
is still an open question.  
2.3.2.2 The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
The relationship between the Bundesverfassungsgericht (FCC) and ECJ is 
notorious, and hence stands out among the rest. The tension between the 
                                               
61 For a more exhaustive analysis see: Lenaerts, Koen and Van Nuffel, Piet, European 
Union Law, 3 ed. 2011, Sweet & Maxwell, pp 772-809. For an analysis on the Swedish 
approach to the issue see: Nergelius, Joakim, 2005 - The Year when European Law and its 
Supremacy was Finally Acknowledged by Swedish Courts., in Cramér and Bull (eds.), 
Swedish Studies in European Law. 2008, s. 145-156. 
62 The judicial branch in France is divided into three supreme courts, each with its own 
function. The Cour de cassation, which deals with civil and criminal matters, the Conseil 
d’Etat, which deals with administrative matters, and the Conseil Constitutionnel, which is 
the only court with the jurisdiction of judicial constitutional review over French legislation, 
i.e. the constitutional court of France. 
63 Judgment of May 24, 1975, Administration des Douanes v. Societé des Cafés Jacques 
Vabre & Société Weigel et Cie,1975, Rec.Dalloz Jurispr., 497. 
64 Judgment of October 30, 1989, Nicolo, 1989, Rec.C.E. 250.  
65 Decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel, inter alia, No. 2004-496 DC, June 10, 2004 and 
No. 2004-498 DC, June 29, 2004. The Conseil d’Etat took a similar stance in the judgment 
on 8 February 2007, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres. See Editorial, 
“Constitutional Identity and the European Courts”, ECLRev., Vol. 3, 2007 p. 177. 
66 Decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel, No. 2004-505 DC, November 19, 2004. English 
translation at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2004505DCen2004_505dc.pdf [Accessed December 
2012]. See also: Richards, Claudina, “The Supremacy of Community Law Before the 
French Constitutional Court”, ELRev., Vol. 31, 2006, p. 499-517. 
67 Decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel, No. 2600-540 DC, July 27, 2007. Even if the 
decision concerns the implementation of directives it is highly plausible that the same is 
true as regards regulations. See Charpy, Chloé, The Status of (Secondary) Community Law 
in the French Internal Order, 2007, ECLRev., Vol. 3, p. 446. 
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courts started with the two famous Solange judgments of the FCC. In 
Solange I, the FCC stated it would reserve the right to review Community 
legislation in light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the German 
Basic Law
68
, as long as the Community did not contain a catalogue of 
fundamental rights equivalent to the ones protected by the Basic Law.
69
 In 
1986 the FCC delivered Solange II, where it confirmed that the protection of 
fundamental rights within the EU where satisfactorily protected. It hence 
declared that it would not exercise its competence to review Community 
legislation as long as the EU and ECJ maintained the same level of 
protection essentially equivalent to the Basic Law.
70
  
 
The Maastricht decision of 1993 reaffirmed the FCC´s position in 
Solange II, albeit emphasizing more strongly the necessity of reviewing 
Community legislation if contrary to the level of fundamental rights 
protection afforded by the Basic law.
71
 At the same time it added a second 
reservation. The FCC stated it also had the competence to review whether 
Community acts where to be considered as breaching the principle of 
conferral, and hence declared ultra vires.
72
 The decision brought loud 
reactions among scholars.
73
 With the Lisbon judgment in June 2009 the 
FCC once again added a dimension to the protection of its constitution. 
Apart from reaffirming its view that the Union cannot take possession of 
any judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz,
74
 the FCC introduced a constitutional 
identity review. The FCC stated that “it must be possible within the German 
jurisdiction to […] preserve the inviolable core content of the Basic Law’s 
constitutional identity by means of a identity review.”75 Even if the FCC 
emphasized that any review would be exercised in light of the principle of 
the Basic Law’s openness towards European law 
(Europarechtsfreundlichkeit), the practical standard afforded to the identity 
review by the FCC is still to be seen. Undoubtedly, Article 4.2 TEU, 
explicitly referred to by the FCC in its decision, will come into play.
76
  
                                               
68 The Constitution of Germany.  
69 Decision of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, at 271. 
70
 Decision of 22 Oct. 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339, at 339.  
71 Decision of 12 Oct. 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155. See also Payandeh, Mehrdad, 
“Constitutional review of EU law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the relationship 
between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice”, CMLRev. Vol. 48, 
2011, p.13. 
72 Decision of 12 Oct. 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155, at 188. 
73 Herdegen, Matthias, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional 
Restraints for an Ever Closer Union”, CMLRev., Vol. 31, 1994, pp. 235-262; and Kokott, 
Juliane, “Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union - zum Vertrag von Maastricht”, 
Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, Vol. 119, 1994, pp. 207 - 237 
74 Decision of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267, paras 240-241. In English at: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html 
[Accessed December 2012].  
75 Decision of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267, para. 240 
76 Decision of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267, para 240.  
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3 National Identity  
3.1 Introduction 
The relationship between EU law and national constitutional law is far from 
simple, as evident from the previous chapter. In the middle of the 
relationship lives the notion of national identities. The term was for the first 
time used by the FCC in Solange I and later found its way in to Article F.1 
of the Treaty of Maastricht.
77
 The article stated that “the Union shall respect 
the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government 
are founded on the principles of democracy.” With the Amsterdam Treaty 
the clause was stripped down to “the Union shall respect the national 
identities of its Member States.” It has therefore been clear, for a long time, 
that the Union has a duty to respect the national identities of its Member 
States. The practical and theoretical importance of this duty has nevertheless 
been widely debated. At the forefront of this discussion lies the question of 
what actually constitutes a national identity, and how Article 4.2 TEU is to 
be applied within the Union legal order. While many scholars have written 
about Article 4.2 TEU, case-law on the matter is scarce. Consequently, 
although the importance of national identities within the Union sphere 
cannot be underestimated, its definition and legal implications are still 
clouded.  
 
This chapter will try to clarify the nebulous notion of national identities as 
enshrined in Article 4.2 TEU by first of all examining its legal context 
(section 3.2) and its use in the case-law of the ECJ (section 3.3). The notion 
has been given a novel formulation in the Lisbon Treaty, connecting 
national identities with constitutional structures of the Member States. This 
has aroused a lot of speculation on its relationship with the principle of 
primacy (section 3.4), and particularly with the notion of constitutional 
pluralism (section 3.5).  
3.2 The Legal Context of the National 
Identity Clause  
The national identity clause was introduced in 1992 with the Maastricht 
Treaty. The wording of the clause, however, left much to desire, laconically 
stating that the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member 
States. With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 came no improvement. 
Moreover, the earlier versions of the clause were not under the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ.
78
 In the Lisbon treaty, the clause, enshrined under Article 4.2 
                                               
77 Von Bogdandy, Armin and Schill, “Stephan, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for 
National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty”, CMLRev., Vol. 48, 2011, p.1435. 
78 Von Bogdandy, Armin and Schill, “Stephan, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for 
National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty”, CMLRev., Vol. 48, 2011, p.1422. 
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TEU, has been given a novel formulation clarifying its scope and definition. 
Article 4.2 TEU reads: 
 
“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including 
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order 
and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains 
the sole responsibility of each Member State.” 
 
Article 4.2 TEU hence spells out three different principles; the respect for 
national identities, the equality between Member States, and the guarantee 
that the Member States’ essential State functions remain their sole 
responsibility. These three principles echo the determination of the Member 
States in asserting themselves as autonomous sovereign actors.
79
  
 
The legal context of the Article 4.2 TEU also reflects this position, and 
strengthens its link with the provisions related to competences.
80
 Firstly, 
Article 5 TEU enshrines the principle of conferral. Secondly, Article 4.1 
TEU establishes the presumption that competences not conferred on the 
Union stays with the Member States. According to Gustaferro, there is an 
intertwined relationship between Articles 4.1 and 4.2 TEU, in that they 
represent two solutions to the same problem of the Union’s competence 
creep. The former addresses the problem by creating a principle of 
presumed Member States’ competence. In case of doubt, the competence 
lies with the Member States. The latter addresses the problem by reminding 
the Union it has a duty to respect the core responsibilities of the Member 
States.
81
 In sum, the relationship between the principle of conferral in 
Article 5 TEU and the national identity clause in Article 4.2 TEU can be 
described as follows; the former reveals what is to be considered as ultra 
vires¸ while the latter reveals what the Union must respect intra vires.   
 
The travaux préparatoires
82
 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe also sheds light on the purpose and meaning of the identity clause. 
Faced with the problem of how to address the issue of Union competence 
creep, the working group entrusted with the issue of the complementary 
competences of the Union sketched out a number of solutions. As any list 
specifying Member States’ reserved competences might suggest that the 
Member States’ competences derived from the Union, and any political 
declaration creating a Charter of Member States’ rights would lack any legal 
weight, the extension of the identity clause quickly grew as the favourable 
                                               
79 Von Bogdandy, Armin and Schill, “Stephan, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for 
National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty”, CMLRev., Vol. 48, 2011, p.1425. 
80 Gustaferro, Barbara, “Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The 
Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/02, 2012, 
p. 33. 
81 Gustaferro, Barbara, “Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The 
Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/02, 2012, 
p. 34. 
82 The legislative history. 
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solution.
83
 It was already rooted in the Treaty, well known and flexible.
84
 
Consequently, the travaux préparatoires implies that the main purpose of 
the identity clause is to protect the core responsibilities and areas of the 
Member States, while “at the same time allowing the necessary margin of 
flexibility.”85 The Member States will remain bound by the provisions in the 
Treaties. Simultaneously, the Union is nonetheless bound to respect the 
national identities of the Member States.
86
 
3.3 Case Law on the National Identity 
Clause 
The case-law on national identities is scarce. Moreover, the national identity 
clause did not fall under the jurisdiction of the ECJ until the Lisbon Treaty. 
This did however not prevent the ECJ from making reference to the notion 
of national identities on a few occasions,
87
 and has certainly not meant that 
the ECJ has not been faced with the issue earlier. The leading case on the 
matter is still the pre-Lisbon case Omega, where a constitutional provision 
of Germany had to be balanced against the free movement of services.
88
 
And undeniably, it is notably within the context of the fundamental 
freedoms, i.e. the internal market, that the identity clause has played its most 
decisive part. 
 
When analysing the case law of the identity clause, two types of cases may 
be deciphered.
89
 Firstly, the clause has been used as an autonomous ground 
for derogation. The Member States have hence directly based their argument 
on Article 4.2 TEU. Secondly, the clause has been used as an aid in 
interpreting existing grounds for derogation, such as public policy. In these 
cases, the clause has therefore been given a supportive function, used as 
leverage to boost existing derogation grounds. While both types of cases are 
of interest in unveiling the mysteries concerning the identity clause, it is the 
                                               
83 Working Group V, working document 5, Highlighting the limits of the EU competence, 
paper by Mr. Henning Christophersen, Brussels, 11 July 2002. As it was Mr. 
Christophersen that introduced the proposal of extending the identity clause, the clause was 
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Michaniki [2008] ECR I-09999, para. 32; and Gustaferro, Barbara, “Beyond the 
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Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/02, 2012, p. 35. 
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cases from the latter type that have dominated the discussions surrounding 
national identities.
90
  
3.3.1 The National Identity Clause As an 
Autonomous Ground for Derrogation 
The cases where the identity clause has been used as an autonomous ground 
for derogation have so far concerned national provisions relating to 
language requirements. In Commission v. Luxembourg, Luxembourg sought 
to rely on the identity clause to justify the exclusion of foreign nationals 
from applying to posts within the field of public education.
91
 The use of the 
Luxembourgish language within the educational system was, according to 
Luxembourg, an essential condition for preserving Luxembourg’s national 
identity. In the highly similar case Commission v. Luxembourg of 2011, 
Luxembourg again tried to rely on the identity clause in relation to the field 
of civil law notaries.
92
 In both cases the ECJ acknowledged the importance 
of preserving the national identities of Member States. The general 
exclusion of nationals from other Member States was nevertheless not 
proportionate, and the national provision was hence not compatible with the 
free movement of workers.
93
  
 
Wardyn concerned the refusal of the Lithuanian authorities from changing 
the surname of a Lithuanian woman married to a Polish national from 
“Vardyn” to “Wardyn”, as Lithuanian characters do not include the letter 
“W”. 94 According to the Lithuanian government, its language constituted a 
constitutional asset that preserved the nation’s identity. Noting that the 
Union, according to Article 22 of the Charter, must respect the Union’s 
cultural and linguistic diversity and Article 4.2 TEU includes the protection 
of a State’s official national language, the ECJ concluded that the national 
rules in question constituted a legitimate objective. The ECJ however stated 
that it was for the national court to determine whether the national rule was 
proportionate.
95
 As opposed to the former cases, the ECJ in Wardyn gave 
guidance as to how to solve the dispute, rather than giving a ready-made 
                                               
90 See Besselink, Leonard, “National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon”, 
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solution
96
. It hence left the national court with a margin of manoeuvre in 
deciding the outcome of the case.
97
  
 
Another interesting case in this context is Spain v. Eurojust.
98
 Spain brought 
an action against the fact that Eurojust had issued applications where both 
English and French were a requirement. Although, as the above, a case on 
language requirements, it is also one of few cases on national identities 
where the legality of an EU act has been reviewed. While the ECJ found the 
case inadmissible, Advocate General Maduro came to the conclusion that 
the language requirements where not inappropriate.
99
   
3.3.2 The National Identity Clause As an Aid in 
Interpreting Existing Grounds for 
Derrogation 
Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein stand out as the cases embodying the national 
identity clause and the discussions surrounding it. While regarded as the 
leading cases on national identities, they are at the same time also important 
cases as regards the discussion between the fundamental freedoms and 
fundamental rights. And indeed, the two issues are intertwined when it 
comes to the identity clause as an aid in interpreting existing grounds for 
derogation.
100
 
3.3.2.1 Omega 
At the outset, it should be noted that neither the Advocate General nor the 
ECJ referred to the national identity clause in Omega. Still, the case is one 
of the most discussed in that relation.
101
 Omega concerned a national 
provision prohibiting the importation of articles related to the game 
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laserdrome
102
. Germany claimed that the commercial exploitation of a 
killing game infringed the human dignity clause in the German Basic law.
103
 
Two issues stood out; first, whether a fundamental right restricting the free 
movement of goods and services could be considered a valid justification, 
and second, whether the fundamental right in question, in this case human 
dignity, had to be based on a legal concept common to all Member States.
104
  
 
At the outset, the ECJ reminded that Article 55 EC (Article 52 TFEU) 
allowed restrictions justified for reasons of public policy, which the 
contested order clearly relied on. According to solid case-law, the 
derogation however had to be interpreted strictly and not be determined 
unilaterally by each Member State. Thus, public policy could only be relied 
on where there was a real and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental 
interest of society. As the concept of public policy nevertheless could vary 
from one state to another, the ECJ acknowledged that the Member States 
must be allowed a margin of discretion.
105
 
 
As regards the first issue, the ECJ noted that Germany enshrined human 
dignity within the concept of public policy, and that the Union itself, by 
drawing inspiration from the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, also protected the concept of human dignity as a general 
principle of EU law. As a result, the ECJ held that the protection of 
fundamental rights, such as human dignity, in principle was a legitimate 
interest justifying a restriction on the fundamental freedoms.
106
  
 
As always, any derogation from the treaty articles has to be proportionate. 
The human dignity clause constituted a constitutional rule in Germany, 
which hence afforded a higher level of protection to the notion than other 
Member States did. In that regard the ECJ held that nothing precluded a 
Member State from affording a different level of protection, and that there 
hence did not exist any “general criterion for assessing the proportionality of 
any national measure which restricts the exercise of an economic 
activity”.107  
3.3.2.2 Sayn-Wittgenstein and Public Policy 
Sayn-Wittgenstein
108
 was the first case decided on Article 4.2 TEU. The 
case concerned an Austrian constitutional rule that prohibited the use of 
surnames containing a title of nobility. The rule, which restricted the free 
                                               
102 A simulated killing game inspired from Star Wars where people play at killing other 
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105 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-09609, para 30-31. 
106 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-09609, para 32 – 35. 
107 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-09609, para 37. 
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movement of persons,
109
 could according to the Austrian government be 
justified since it implemented the principle of equal treatment. Similarly to 
Omega, the ECJ interpreted the relied justification in connection with the 
notion of public policy. It hence reaffirmed its position in Omega, quoting 
large parts of its previous judgment. In addition, and most significantly, it 
stated that “in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to 
respect the national identities of its Member States, which include the status 
of the State as a Republic.”110 The court finished by concluding rather 
vaguely that it could not be disproportionate for a Member State to protect 
the principle of equal treatment by “prohibiting the use [...], of titles of 
nobility or noble elements which may create the impression that the bearer 
of the name is holder of such a rank.”111 
 
Particular attention should be given to the fact that the ECJ, both in Omega 
and Sayn-Wittgenstein, linked the constitutional specificities of each case 
with the exception of public policy. As stated by the ECJ in Omega, public 
policy has to be interpreted strictly. A rule can only be characterized as one 
protecting public policy if it addresses a real and sufficiently serious danger, 
and protects a fundamental interest of society. The contested rule thus has to 
be of particular importance in the society to fall under public policy. As 
such, public policy might be seen as a general clause that can be filled with 
different values, from fundamental rights (Omega) to provisions linked to 
the basic structure of the state (Sayn-Wittgenstein).
112
 While the exception 
of public policy is often used and is of high importance, the ECJ has 
however stated that the purpose of the exception is not to reserve certain 
matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States.
113
 Hence, the 
exception of public policy may not be used to alter the allocation of 
competences between the Union and the Member States.
114
 The link 
between the national identity clause and public policy will be further 
discussed under section 5.4. 
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3.3.2.3 Michaniki 
Michaniki
115
 might not be as (in)-famous as the two previous cases. It is 
nevertheless of significance as the disputed constitutional rule was found to 
protect a legitimate interest but nevertheless not considered to be 
proportionate. The constitutional character of the contested provision was 
never mentioned in the judgment, and the contested provision hence never 
examined by the ECJ in light of Article 4.2 TEU. Advocate General Maduro 
however did examine its application in the case. The case concerned a 
Greek constitutional provision excluding tenderers involved in the media 
sector from participating in public procurement contracts, irrespective of 
whether their involvement in the media sector had a potential negative effect 
on competition. According to the Greek state, the provision was necessary 
as to ensure equal treatment and transparency, since undertakings 
responding to a call for tenders otherwise could use its media power in order 
to influence the final decision awarding a contract.
116
  
 
As mentioned, Advocate General Maduro addressed the constitutional 
aspect of the case by referring to the identity clause. The Advocate General 
stated that respect for national identities was there from the beginning of the 
European project in the 1950s, forming part of its very essence “which 
consists of following the path of integration while maintaining the political 
existence of the States.”117 More importantly, he stated, with reference to 
Omega, that “the preservation of national constitutional identity can also 
enable a Member State to develop, within certain limits, its own definition 
of a legitimate interest capable of justifying an obstacle to a fundamental 
freedom of movement.”118 The Advocate General hence held that the Greek 
authorities in the present case had a certain margin in defining the concept 
of equal treatment and transparency. He nevertheless found the national 
provision to be disproportionate since the provision created an irrebuttable 
presumption of a general incompatibility between public procurement 
sectors and media.
119
 
 
The ECJ, disregarding the constitutional feature of the contested provision, 
followed the opinion of the Advocate General and held that Member States 
were allowed a certain discretion for the purpose of adopting measures 
indended to safeguard the principles of equal treatment and transparency. 
Just as the Advocate General, the ECJ however found the provision 
disproportionate. The fact that the ECJ made no reference to the 
constitutional feature of the contested provision,
120
 is presumably a simple 
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one. As the principle of primacy stands above all national provisions, 
including constitutional ones, the ECJ underscored that exact position – the 
irrelevance of the status of any national provision infringing Union law.
121
 
The outcome of the case should not necessarily be interpreted as a triumph 
of EU law over national constitution law. It was not the rule per se that was 
found flawed, but its implementation.  
3.4 Primacy and the National Identity 
Clause 
3.4.1 National Identity As the Last Safe House 
On October 2, 2012 Advocate General Bot delivered the highly anticipated 
opinion in the case Melloni
122
, with a following judgment by the ECJ in 
February 26, 2013. The case concerned a preliminary reference made by the 
Constitutional Court of Spain, the first one of its kind.
123
 Melloni, an Italian 
national, was sentenced in absentia in Italy to ten years’ imprisonment. 
After being arrested in Spain, Italy issued a European arrest warrant for the 
execution of his sentence. Melloni however challenged the extradition 
before the Constitutional Court of Spain on the grounds that the sentence 
issued in absentia infringed his right to a fair trial. While Spanish 
constitutional law allows such a review, Framework Decision 2002/584 on 
the European arrest warrant does not. Among other questions, the 
Constitutional Court asked the ECJ if it could rely on Article 53 of the 
Charter to uphold the higher protection given to fundamental rights by 
Spanish Constitutional law than EU secondary law. The core of the issue is 
consequently the interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter (the level of 
protection provision).
124
  
 
Advocate General Bot held in a very solid opinion, that it would undermine 
the principle of primacy if Article 53 of the Charter would be interpreted as 
allowing Member States the right to afford a higher level of protection than 
that afforded by the Union. The uniform and effective application of Union 
law throughout the Member States would likewise be jeopardized. It is 
therefore essential, within the ambit of Union law, to link the level of 
protection afforded to a fundamental right with the objectives of the Union 
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action concerned.
125
 Moreover, the Advocate General noted that the words 
“in their respective fields of application” in Article 53 of the Charter seeks 
to reassure the Member States that the Charter does not affect the level of 
protection given by their constitutions within the application of national 
law.
126
 
 
The opinion is a sharp reminder that the principle of primacy is limitless 
within the field of EU law. A secondary Union act hence stands above 
national constitutional provisions in the hierarchy scale. The Advocate 
General however concluded, in the last passage of his opinion, that the 
Union has an obligation to respect the national identities of the Member 
States, and that this obligation also is enshrined in the preamble of the 
Charter. Accordingly, “a Member State which considers that a provision of 
secondary law adversely affects its national identity may [...] challenge it on 
the basis of Article 4(2) TEU.”127 Seen as an isolated statement, the 
reference to Article 4.2 TEU might slip by as trivial. However, seen within 
its context – up until the reference to Article 4.2 TEU the whole opinion 
stands on the importance of the principle of primacy and uniform 
application of Union law – the reference cannot be undervalued. While 
being a mere obiter dictum, the citation uncovers an significant aspect of the 
identity clause, namely the fact that it, within the ambit of EU law, 
represents the last “safe house” for national constitutions against the 
otherwise limitless reach of the principle of primacy.  
 
As regards the judgment by the ECJ, it basically summarized the Advocate 
General’s opinion. However, not surprisingly, it did not mention the 
national identity clause.
128
 
3.4.2 National Identity As a Sword and As a 
Shield 
It has been observed that this “safe house” has two characteristics. 
According to Konstadinidies the national identity clause can be used as 
either a sword or a shield against the primacy of EU law. As a sword by the 
national constitutional courts, e.g. the FCC, which uses Article 4.2 TEU as a 
judicial review mechanism. As a shield when defending a national provision 
by relying on the identity clause as a valid derogation from the principle of 
primacy.
129
 This two-fold characteristic of the identity clause clearly 
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represents two sides of the same coin in that Member States see Article 4.2 
TEU as a means of excluding EU law from no-go areas. It is not implausible 
that where a Member State finds that the shield gives no result, it will take 
up arms instead.  
 
Although seen as a tool overcoming absolute primacy,
130
 this does in no 
way imply that Member States relying on Article 4.2 TEU as a shield have a 
carte blanche to derogate from the application of Union law. The duty to 
respect national identities does therefore not create an absolute obligation 
for EU law to yield against all national constitutional rules.
131
 The 
implication of the national identity clause to the primacy of EU law is 
somewhat more elaborated. As seen in for instance Omega and Sayn-
Wittgenstein, the application of Article 4.2 TEU requires that a 
“proportional balance be found between the uniform application of EU law, 
a fundamental constitutional principle of the EU, and the national identity of 
the Member State in question.”132 The mere fact that a provision is part of 
the Member States’ national identity, and as such recognized by the ECJ, 
does therefore not lead to the exclusion of Union law, except where that 
provision is proportionate to the aim pursued.  
 
While the success of the identity clause as a shield hence lies in the hands 
and mercy of the ECJ, its potential as a sword lies in the hands of the 
national constitutional courts. Konstadinides argues that although the 
implications and effects of the identity clause as a shield have been reduced 
to a bare minimum by the ECJ through the principle of proportionality and 
sincere cooperation, its implications as a sword remains a theoretical 
possibility.
133
 The interpretation of the possible use of the identity clause by 
the FCC in its Lisbon judgement has on the other hand been criticised as too 
broad.
134
 It is hence still to be seen how much of a barrier the identity clause 
creates as a sword.  
 
Irrespective of whether the identity clause is used as a shield or sword, its 
implications and success will to a large extent depend on how it will be 
interpreted by the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. This leads us 
to the next point; what is a national identity and who gets to decide? 
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3.5 The Definition of National Identities 
3.5.1 What is a National Identity? 
Article 4.2 TFEU reads “national identities inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional.” Thus, regardless of the ambiguities 
surrounding the concept of national identities, the connection between 
“national identities” and “constitutional identities” is self-evident. It is at the 
same time safe to say that the notion “includes far less than the traditional 
concept of State sovereignty as it is understood in both international and 
constitutional law.“135 Consequently, the concept of the identity clause is 
described as being narrower than constitutional law as a whole.
136
 In Sayn-
Wittgenstein Advocate General Sharpston and the ECJ referred to a 
“fundamental constitutional rule“ rather than a  mere “constitutional 
rule”.137 This might also be deciphered by reading Article 4.2 TEU in itself 
as it states “fundamental structures”, implying a degree of essentiality. Apart 
from the constitutional dimension of national identities, the notion also has 
close ties with the protection of cultural identity, as stated by Advocate 
General Kokott in UTECA.
138
 However, the wording of Article 4.2 TEU 
suggests that the notion of national identities, within that clause, does not 
include cultural identity.
139
 Cultural identity might nonetheless be protected 
as a constitutional identity, as advocated by the Lithuanian government in 
Wardyn.
140
  
 
A more concrete definition of national identities is difficult. While the 
notion, in light of its constitutional character, includes rules protecting 
Member States’ commitment to democracy, rules governing the 
organisation of a Member State (e.g. federalism or a republican form of 
governance) and the principle of rule of law, a more exhaustive list is bound 
                                               
135 Von Bogdandy, Armin and Schill, Stephan, “Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect 
for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty”, CMLRev. Vol. 48, 2011, p.1426. 
136 See van der Schyffl, Gerard, “The constitutional relationship between the European 
Union and its Member States: the role of national identity in article 4(2) TEU”, ELRev, 
Vol. 37, No. 5, 2012, p. 13. 
137 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston on 14 October 2010 in Case C-208/09 Sayn-
Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I-13693, para. 65; and Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] 
ECR I-13693, para 93. The Conseil constituionnel has developed a similar definition to the 
notion of national identities. See De Witte, Bruno, “Direct Effect, Primacy and The Nature 
of The Legal Order”, in Craig, Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne, The Evolution of EU Law, 2ed, 
2011, p. 355. 
138 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott on 4 September 2008 in Case C-222/07 UTECA 
[2009] ECR I-1407, para 93. 
139 van der Schyffl, Gerard, “The constitutional relationship between the European Union 
and its Member States: the role of national identity in article 4(2) TEU”, ELRev., Vol. 37, 
No. 5, 2012, p. 5; and Von Bogdandy, Armin and Schill, Stephan, “Overcoming Absolute 
Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty”, CMLRev., Vol. 48, 2011, 
p.1427. 
140 Besselink, Leonard, “National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon”, 
Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, 2010, p. 44.  
 32 
to fail.
 141
 What might be constitutionally significant to one Member State 
must necessarily not be significant to another, as for instance seen with 
human dignity in Germany. The Union consists of 27 Member States, each 
with its own constitution, and hence national identity.  
3.5.2 Who Decides? 
It is within each Member State’s competence to decide what its national 
identity is.
142
 It would undermine the entire raison d'être of national 
identities if it were to be decided by another entity. Whereas Member States 
are best placed to express their own national identities, this, however, does 
not mean they are entirely free to do so. Firstly, they are bound by the 
frames set by Article 4.2 TEU. Secondly, they are also bound to the 
principle of sincere cooperation.
143
 In the words of the FCC: “The exercise 
of this review power, [...] follows the principle of the Basic Law’s openness 
towards European Law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit), and it therefore also 
does not contradict the principle of sincere cooperation.”144 It is furthermore 
not conceivable that the ECJ would accept a national identity that diverges 
from the fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU. 
 
The ECJ does not have the formal competence to determine the national 
identity of a Member State. That would involve an interpretation of national 
constitutional law, which it has no jurisdiction to do according to Article 
19.1 TEU. Article 4.2 TEU is nevertheless a provision of EU law, and is as 
such subject to the interpretation and control of the ECJ. While the ECJ 
consequently does not have the jurisdiction to decide whether a provision is 
part of a Member States national identity, it does have the jurisdiction and 
the responsibility, as the guardian of the Treaties, to determine the relevance 
of that provision under EU law. It is therefore the task of the ECJ to resolve 
the relationship of a national identity, expressed through a domestic 
constitutional rule, vis-á-vis EU law.
145
 If the ECJ for instance were to find 
a national identity as contrary to the Union’s fundamental values enshrined 
in Article 2 TEU, it would surely not fall under Article 4.2 TEU.  
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3.6 Constitutional Pluralism Through the 
National Identity Clause 
The fact that national identities are determined by reference to domestic 
constitutional law, although the identity clause is a provision of EU law and 
as such subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, has drawn the attention of 
many scholars to the link between the identity clause and the theory of 
constitutional pluralism.
146
 Maduro holds that the notion of legal pluralism 
is that all legal orders, both European and national, need to respect each 
other. Any national identity must be defined in a manner that does not 
challenge another Member State’s identity or “the pluralist conception of the 
European legal order itself”.147 In a European Union endorsing the view of 
constitutional pluralism, the principle of primacy can thus not be regarded 
as absolute. Pluralism implies that no formal hierarchy exists between the 
Union and the Member States.
148
  
 
In that the national identity clause is adverse to the idea of an absolute 
primacy of EU law, the clause supports a pluralistic view of the relationship 
between the legal order of the Union and that of the Member States. This 
pluralistic relationship can furthermore be seen by the fact that the national 
constitutional courts view the principle of primacy as existing due to their 
voluntary acceptance. Consequently, they accept the primacy of EU law as 
long as it does not violate their fundamental constitutional values.
149
 A 
Union based on constitutional pluralism hence tears down the hierarchical 
view of the relationship between the Union and the Member States.  
 
As earlier mentioned, all Member States necessarily need to be their own 
arbiter in defining their national identities. In this regard, the principle of 
equality enshrined in Article 4.2 TEU is of utter importance. The Union 
consists of 27 Member States, each different from the other. There are 
republics and monarchies, parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems 
and so on. The Union accommodates these differences through its motto 
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“United in Diversity”, and it is against this axiom that the national identity 
clause should be examined.
 150
  
 
The identity clause is however not to be understood as the arch nemesis of 
the principle of primacy. Neither should the theory of constitutional 
pluralism be understood as challenging EU law, since the Member States 
and the Union in essence are grounded on the same fundamental values.
151
 
When defining their national identities, the national constitutional courts 
have so far, in essence, demanded that the Union exercise its competence 
with respect to certain essential constitutional principles, such as the 
statehood of Member States, the rule of law, democracy and the essential 
core of fundamental rights.
152
 These values correspond to Article 2 TEU, 
stating that the Union is founded on the values of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. As a 
result, any divergence between an EU act and the national identities of 
Member States is bound to be exceptional.
153
 The scarce cases on Article 
4.2 TEU point to the same conclusion. Accordingly, the principle of 
primacy would only need to take a step back in those exceptional situations 
where an essential constitutional provision, expressing the national identity 
of a Member State, would be acknowledged by the ECJ as protected under 
Article 4.2 TEU. In other words, the principle of primacy sometimes needs 
to allow the constitutional specificity of a Member State a certain margin of 
appreciation as to allow that specificity to shine through in harmony with 
the Union’s dictum “United in Diversity.” This brings us to the next chapter, 
which will address the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
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4 The Margin of Appreciation 
4.1 Introduction 
The Margin of appreciation doctrine has since the 1950´s played a dominant 
role within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
154
 Though 
originally stemming from the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat, it was the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that introduced the doctrine on 
an international level.
155
 The doctrine arose as a response to the ECtHR’s 
complex position as an international human rights court, in an effort to 
mediate between the universality and particularism of the Convention 
structure.
156
 Eventually the doctrine also made its way to the ECJ, under the 
label “margin of discretion”, used to mediate between national public 
interests and EU objectives.  
 
Though both courts are supranational, it is essential to keep in mind that 
they operate within different frameworks. While the ECJ stands on a more 
solid basis, carried by the principle of primacy and the fact that its 
judgments in the preliminary reference procedure has an erga omnes effect, 
the ECtHR lacks both features. Its judgments are binding only in relation to 
the State that is party to the dispute. Moreover, there is nothing similar to 
the principle of primacy in the ECHR.
157
 Rather, the ECtHR has on more 
than one occasion stressed that “the machinery of protection established by 
the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human 
rights.”158 Gerards observes that this difference, consequently, means that 
the ECtHR to a lesser extent than the ECJ is faced with conflicts between its 
own legal order and national constitutional provisions, “since this 
problematic is the particular result of the existence of two different legal 
orders that both lay a claim to final authority.”159 She nevertheless adds that 
the ECtHR has influenced national policy and legislation with an increasing 
directness. This has for instance forced the FCC to stress, in a similar 
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decision to that of its Lisbon judgment, that the “Basic Law [...] does not 
waive the sovereignty contained in the last instance in the German 
Convention”, which hence remains the final test for application of the 
ECHR.
160
 As a result, the position of the ECtHR is “more similar to that of 
the EU courts than might seem to be the case if the legal situation were 
taken at face value.”161 Despite the differences between the courts, both are 
thus exposed to the same fundamental problem, namely that of pluralism.  
 
As mentioned, the ECtHR has primarily approached the problem by 
reminding that the ECHR’s application is subsidiary to the human rights 
protection of the Contracting Parties. Since the principle of subsidiarity 
embraces the view that the task of the ECtHR is to review the decisions 
delivered by the national courts, and not to take their place as regards the 
protection of human rights, the principle has been regarded as the 
underlying inspiration for the development of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine.
162
 As regards EU law, it has similarly been observed that the 
principle of subsidiarity in many ways is present within the justification 
assessment of the ECJ.
163
 Consequently, the same link between the principle 
of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation might be observed within EU 
law as well.  
 
Although the margin of appreciation doctrine has a solid base within the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, it is still most renowned in relation to the ECHR. 
It is the sheer wealth of case-law and commentary on its use within ECHR 
that justifies its usefulness in examining it within the ambit of EU law.
164
 
Thus, this chapter will first examine the doctrine as used by the ECtHR 
(section 4.2), and then turn to its use by the ECJ (section 4.3). The 
relationship between the margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of 
proportionality will also be addressed (section 4.4).  
4.2 The ECtHR and the Margin of 
Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation doctrine evolved as a means to mediate between 
the universality and particularism of the ECHR structure. The doctrine is 
hence used as a tool in allowing the Contracting Parties a certain space of 
manoeuvre when implementing the ECHR’s standards. Occasionally, the 
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court will also allow a certain margin in defining the human right at hand.
165
 
In other words, the doctrine is based on the idea that the Contracting States 
are permitted a certain latitude in protecting the human rights enshrined in 
the ECHR.
166
 In light of the principle of subsidiarity, the doctrine, is based 
on the assumption that the Contracting States are in a better position, than 
the international judge, to evaluate the different interests at stake in a given 
case.
167
  
 
When the ECtHR examines interferences upon a right protected under the 
Convention, it usually does this in a three-stage process.
168
 First, it examines 
the lawfulness of the restriction. Second, it examines whether the restriction 
serves a legitimate purpose. Third, it examines whether the restriction is 
proportionate or necessary in a democratic society.
169
 The expression 
“necessary” has, by the court, been interpreted as implying the existence of 
a “pressing social need”.170 It is within this last stage that the margin of 
appreciation is used. Although it is difficult to predict the exact application 
and effect of the doctrine, some guidance can be found in the case-law of 
the ECtHR. Its scope will sometimes be broad and other times narrow 
depending on the nature of the rights in issue, or on the balancing of 
competing rights.
171
 The typical example of where the margin will be broad 
is in moral areas where there is no common consensus regarding the subject 
at hand between the Contracting States. Such were the facts in the landmark 
case Handyside v. United Kingdom.
172
 On the other hand, the margin of 
appreciation will for instance be narrow if the core of a Convention right is 
affected.
173
 The doctrine hence regulates the intensity of review of the 
ECtHR. The court will only superficially examine the choices made by the 
competent national authority when the margin is broad, and, by contrast, 
closely consider the facts of the case if the margin is narrow.
174
  
 
                                               
165 Eg, Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00, 8 July 2004, 40 EHRR 12.  
166 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002, at 2. 
167 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493:72, 7 December 1976, EHRR 737, para. 
48. 
168 Sweeney, James, A “Margin of Appreciation” in the Internal Market: Lessons from the 
European Court of Human Rights”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 34, 2007, 
p. 30. 
169 eg, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 26 April 1979, 2 EHRR 245. 
170 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493:72, 7 December 1976, EHRR 737, 
para. 48.  
171 White, Robin and Ovey, Clare, The European Convention on Human Rights, 5th ed. 
Oxford 2010, p. 326.  
172 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493:72, 7 December 1976, EHRR 737. The 
case concerned the conviction of a man that had published the book “Little Red 
Schoolbook”, which had been seized and confiscated as obscene as it contained information 
on sexual matters for adolescents.  
173 Gerards, Janneke, “Pluralism Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”, ELJ 
Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011, p. 104; and eg Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, 10 April 
207, 46 EHRR 728, para. 77. 
174 Gerards, Janneke, “Pluralism Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”, ELJ 
Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011, p. 104 
 38 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is not without criticism. Apart from the 
underlying reality that the doctrine undermines the universality of human 
rights, it is often criticised for the difficulty in predicting its application and 
the fact that it lacks clear standards. It has for instance been observed that 
“the margin of appreciation varies not only in relation to different 
exceptions, but in relation to the same exceptions in different contexts. “175 
Against this background Letsas has, in an effort to clarify the ambiguity 
surrounding the doctrine, noted that the ECtHR uses the margin of 
appreciation in two different ways. As regards the first method, which he 
calls the substantive concept of the doctrine, the margin of appreciation 
serves as a tool in interpreting the tension between individual rights and 
collective goals. Most notably, this is the case with national security, where 
the ECtHR has allowed a broad margin of appreciation to the Contracting 
states.
176
 The second method, which he calls the structural concept, is based 
on the idea that the ECHR is an international convention, and not a national 
bill of rights. As such, the Contracting States are better placed to evaluate 
certain situations. This is for instance the case where there exists no 
common consensus among the Contracting States.
177
  
 
Irrespective of the ambiguities surrounding the margin of appreciation its 
importance cannot be underestimated in examining whether a restriction is 
necessary in a democratic society.
178
 It is one of the most important 
safeguards developed within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in reconciling 
“the effective operation of the ECHR with the sovereign powers and 
responsibilities of governments in a democracy.”179  
4.3 The ECJ and the Margin of Discretion 
The fact that both the ECtHR and the ECJ employs the margin of discretion 
doctrine is based on the link between the courts in their endeavour to 
reconcile universality with particularism. Within the ambit of EU law, it is 
however not the universality as much as the uniform application of EU law 
that has to be balanced against the national values and individualities of the 
Member States. Looking specifically at the internal market, it is instead the 
economic freedoms that have to be balanced against national public 
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interests.
180
 It is also within the context of the internal market where the 
margin of discretion prominently has figured.  
 
It is naturally so that when goods, persons and services cross borders, they 
are likely to cross value borders as well. Consequently, the ECJ is often 
faced with cases where either fundamental rights stand against each other, or 
fundamental rights stand against the objectives of the economic freedoms.
181
 
The Omega case might be seen as a combination of both, in that the case 
involved both the conflict between human dignity and the free movement of 
services, as well as the conflict between different understandings of the right 
of human dignity.
182
 The Omega case is also a good example of a situation 
where the ECJ relied on a margin of discretion, reiterating its frequently 
used words that “the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to 
the concept of public policy may vary from one country to another and from 
one era to another. The competent national authorities must therefore be 
allowed a margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.”183 
The margin of discretion also played an important part in the Schmidberger 
case, where the ECJ had to balance the free movement of goods against the 
freedom of expression. The ECJ concluded that the competent authorities, in 
determining whether a fair balance had been struck between the competing 
rights, enjoyed a wide margin of discretion, subject to the principle of 
proportionality.
184
 
 
The margin of discretion also shines through in other aspects of Union law. 
It figures both within the context of the Member States’ responsibility to 
enforce Union law
185
 and their obligation to implement it.
186
 Indeed, the 
doctrine is well embraced within the design of directives, since the rational 
behind directives is to leave the choice of form and method for 
implementing EU objectives open to the Member States. However, it has 
been observed that this discretion rather should be labelled as an 
“implementing discretion” than a “margin of discretion”.187 
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4.4 The Margin of Appreciation and the 
Principle of Proportionality 
The margin of appreciation does not equal an absolute power for the state to 
act as it sees fit. While a narrow or wide margin will indicate that the ECJ or 
ECtHR will perform either a thorough or a superficial examination, the 
exercise of the discretion left to the national authority must always remain 
within certain limits, most notably set by the principle of proportionality as 
seen in Michaniki. There are however no general criteria or guidelines for 
assessing how the principle of proportionality will be applied in a case 
where the state has been granted a certain margin of appreciation.  
 
While the coexistence of the principle of proportionality and the margin of 
appreciation is far from easy to decipher, it is important to note that the two 
notions function on different levels. The margin of appreciation deals with 
the relationship between the state actor and the international judge. It is a 
tool used to reconcile the views from a national perspective with views from 
an international perspective. The principle of proportionality is on the other 
hand only relevant at the national level. The principle of proportionality 
consequently reflects a balance of facts within the national legal system, i.e. 
by determining whether the national actor acted in a manner which was both 
suitable and necessary as regards the objectives pursued.
188
 As a result, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine does not exclude the application of the 
proportionality principle. It is never a question of whether the principle of 
proportionality should be applied at all, but rather which proportionality test 
to apply.
189
 
 
Despite the fact that the margin of appreciation has limits, its usage by the 
ECtHR and the ECJ has allowed their Member States a certain flexibility 
when acting under their supranational obligations. The doctrine could in the 
same way serve as a valuable instrument as regards national identities. It is 
only then, as a flexibility clause, that Article 4.2 TEU might serve its raison 
d'être. 
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5 National Identity As a 
Flexibility Clause 
5.1 Introduction  
Despite the novel formulation given to the national identity clause in Article 
4.2 TEU, there are still substantial ambiguities surrounding it. The national 
identity clause is often understood as standing in contrast to the principle of 
primacy, yet their exact relationship is far from certain. National identities 
are furthermore primarily described as a constitutional identity, 
nevertheless, no precise definition exists. The national identity clause is also 
said to be of importance within the debate of the Union’s competences, 
however, no one knows its impact in that regard. In sum, although much can 
be deduced from the case-law of the ECJ, the exact function of Article 4.2 
TEU within the Union legal order remains to be seen. 
 
The fact that not only the exact definition but also the exact function of the 
national identity clause remains clouded weakens the Union as the tension 
between the Union legal order and the national constitutions remains 
unsolved. Seeing Article 4.2 TEU seen as a flexibility clause in order to 
reconcile Member States’ national identities with the objectives of the 
Union, might be a viable solution in easing that tension. As such, the 
function of the identity clause would primarily be that of giving the 
constitutional specificities of the Member States the ability to shine through 
in harmony with the Union’s dictum “United in Diversity”.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to unite the national identity clause with the 
margin of appreciation doctrine. That connection will be addressed under 
four different chapters. First, the notion of constitutional pluralism, the 
principle of subsidiarity and the principle of conferral, will be examined in 
relation to Article 4.2 TEU seen as a flexibility clause. As such, it is argued 
that all three notions create the legal context whereupon Article 4.2 TEU 
seen as a flexibility clause may be placed. Second, it will turn to how 
Article 4.2 TEU as a flexibility clause can impact the future application of 
the national identity clause. In that regard, it is argued that it can be applied 
in two different ways; a) by providing a more lenient test of proportionality, 
and, b) by inviting the ECJ to give guidance judgments rather than ready-
made solutions. (section 5.3). Third, the close relationship between national 
constitutional identities and the concept of public policy will be addressed, 
(section 5.4). Finally, any analysis on the function of the national identity 
clause inevitably needs a thorough assessment on its impact on the principle 
of primacy. Hence, the last section will address how Article 4.2 TEU as a 
flexibility clause affects the principle of primacy and how these can coexist 
(section 5.5). 
 
 42 
5.2 Finding the Legal Context of National 
Identities As a Flexibility Clause 
Seeing Article 4.2 TEU as a flexibility clause granting Member States a 
margin of appreciation is but one of many views on its potential function.
190
 
It is however not without substantial support if viewed together with the 
theory of constitutional pluralism and the principles of subsidiarity and 
conferral. All three notions create the legal context for Article 4.2 TEU as a 
flexibility clause.  
5.2.1 Constitutional Pluralism and the Margin of 
Appreciation 
The concept of constitutional pluralism implies that there formally does not 
exist any hierarchical division between EU law and the national 
constitutions. As previously stated, the link between the national identity 
clause and constitutional pluralism might easily be made. If the Union is to 
respect the national identities of the Member States, constitutional pluralism 
certainly seems as the foundation whereupon Article 4.2 TEU should rest. It 
might however also be understood the other way around, that is, the national 
identity clause seen as the legal remedy available in the Treaties whereupon 
constitutional pluralism can rest.   
 
The theory of constitutional pluralism should not be regarded as challenging 
the Union legal order. In that the essential constitutional principles of the 
Member States are part of EU law as well, any divergence between the latter 
and national constitutions will be exceptional. When such conflicts however 
do arise, there has to be a better solution than absolute primacy. Neither the 
CC, the FCC, or any other constitutional court would allow for such an 
outcome. It is however a difficult tightrope. How much constitutional 
pluralism can the Union embrace without losing the uniform application of 
EU law? It boils down to the paradox that EU law necessarily needs the 
principle of primacy in order to have a uniform and efficient application of 
Union law, while at the same time allowing national constitutional 
individualities the possibility to exist and manoeuvre within its sphere. In 
this regard, constitutional pluralism implies two things. Firstly, and as 
already mentioned, it implies the coexistence between Union provisions and 
national constitutions. Secondly, and consequently, it also implies a 
coexistence between pluralism and unity.
 191
 Article 4.2 TEU seen together 
with the margin of appreciation doctrine might serve as a plausible answer 
in how to accommodate both these aspects.  
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The margin of appreciation fits particularly well together with constitutional 
pluralism. The coexistence of two opposite legal orders is only plausible in a 
space where both are allowed a certain room of manoeuvre, where neither 
will encroach upon the other. Additionally, the margin of appreciation 
allows for a view of Union law and national constitutions where they do not 
necessarily stand in contrast. Pluralism and unity would visibly interact 
without fully defeating each other.
192
 Any Member State with a core 
constitutional rule interfering with Union law should, in line with the 
principle of sincere cooperation, as far as possible try to adjust the contested 
rule to the Union standard. The Union should at the same time allow 
Member States the sufficient amount of space needed to safeguard their 
individual specificities.  
 
5.2.2 The National Identity Clause and the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Conferral 
The abovementioned solution is additionally consolidated by the fact that 
the margin of appreciation doctrine stems from the principle of subsidiarity. 
If the margin of appreciation within the theory of constitutional pluralism 
has the function of giving Member States the sufficient amount of space 
needed to safeguard their individual specificities, the principle of 
subsidiarity answers the question why Member States should be given that 
space to begin with. In sum, the reasoning goes as follows. Constitutional 
pluralism needs the margin of appreciation as to grease the friction between 
the Union legal order and national constitutions. The principle of 
subsidiarity in turn provides the legal platform to why the margin of 
appreciation should be used. Where then does the national identity clause 
enter the picture? The answer would be at both stages of the reasoning. 
 
Firstly, and as already stated, Article 4.2 TEU reflects a pluralistic view of 
the Union legal order as it is tied to the core constitutional specificities of 
the Member States. Secondly, Article 4.2 TEU however also in itself 
reflects, irrespective of whether one links it with the margin of appreciation, 
the Union’s commitment to the principle of subsidiarity.193 This is because 
Article 4.2 TEU decisively separates the Union from the core constitutional 
provisions of its Member States, letting those provisions instead be defined 
and protected by the lowest tier of government capable of addressing the 
question, i.e. the Member States themselves. “Lowest” in this regard, means 
closest to the people. Thus, democracy is an essential feature behind the 
principle of subsidiarity. The first identity clause, Article F.1 in the 
Maastricht Treaty, made this connection, stating the Union shall respect the 
national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are 
founded on the principles of democracy. Consequently, Article F.1 of the 
                                               
192 See Sweeney, James, “A “Margin of Appreciation” in the Internal Market: Lessons from 
the European Court of Human Rights”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 34, 
2007, p. 41. 
193 The same observation has been made in Dashwood, Alan et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s 
European Union law, 6th ed. 2011, Hart Publishing, p. 115. 
 44 
Maastricht Treaty said more than meets the eye, effectively connecting the 
national identity clause to the principle of subsidiarity, and ultimately 
democracy. In sum, both the theory of constitutional pluralism and the 
principle of subsidiarity provide the legal context for seeing Article 4.2 TEU 
as a flexibility clause.  
 
A third connection must nonetheless be made. As stated in section 3.2, 
Article 4.2 TEU is placed next to the provisions related to the competences 
of the Union. It is both surrounded by Article 5 and 4.1 TEU, the former 
enshrining the principle of conferral and the latter creating the presumption 
that competences not conferred on the Union stays with the Member States. 
As a result, the national identity clause does not only reiterate a commitment 
to the principle of subsidiarity, but also the principle of conferral. Article 4.2 
TEU clearly reflects the determination of the Member States in not 
transferring their core constitutional specificities to the Union. It has 
previously been stated that the relationship between Article 5 TEU and 
Article 4.2 TEU is that the former reveals what is to be considered as ultra 
vires¸ while the latter reveals what the Union must respect intra vires. 
Following the logic of the argument to its limit, Article 4.2 TEU would 
hence reveal what the Union must respect intra vires, as to not become ultra 
vires. In sum, neglecting Article 4.2 TEU would equal neglecting the 
principle of conferral. This is further supported by the fact that Article 4.2 
TEU in itself, apart from the identity clause, also enshrines the guarantee 
that the Member States’ essential State functions remain their sole 
responsibility. 
 
 “[The Union] shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national 
security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State.”  
 
Examined independently, Article 4.2 TEU, in itself, therefore has strong 
ties with the division of competences between the Union and its Member 
States, and the principle of conferral. 
5.3 National Identity and the Margin of 
Appreciation 
The application of the margin of appreciation to the national identity clause 
is not a revolutionary concept in itself. As seen in Omega and Sayn-
Wittgenstein the doctrine is applied and used by the ECJ in both cases.
194
 As 
previously stated Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein fall under the line of case-
law where the identity clause has been used as an aid in interpreting existing 
grounds for derogation, i.e. public policy in the cases mentioned. 
Considering that public policy derogations usually lead to the application of 
a margin of appreciation, it is up to debate how much the national identity 
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aspect of the two cases actually influenced its use. The margin of 
appreciation doctrine would presumably have been applied irrespective of 
whether the contested national provisions were of a constitutional character. 
While the connection between the margin of appreciation and the national 
identity clause thus is apparent in Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein, their 
relationship and mutual effect on each other is, on the other hand, yet not 
deciphered. In this regard, this paper proposes two different ways in which 
the margin of appreciation may materialize itself within national identity 
cases, both possible to deduce from existing case-law. First, it is suggested 
that the doctrine can have a possible impact on the principle of 
proportionality. Second, as a doctrine stemming from the principle of 
subsidiarity, it is suggested that the ECJ as far as possible should try to give 
guidance judgments, rather than giving ready-made solutions.  
5.3.1 Less Restrictive Proportionality Test 
The entire reason for connecting the margin of appreciation to the national 
identity clause is as argued to give Member States the possibility to 
incorporate their own constitutional specificities to the European integration 
project. By allowing them a certain margin of flexibility, as stated in the 
travaux préparatoires of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
they would be able to grow together with the Union rather than besides it.  
 
Konstadinides argues that the implications of the identity clause as a shield 
so far have been reduced to a bare minimum by the ECJ through the 
principle of proportionality.
195
 The margin of appreciation doctrine could 
however offer another solution by altering the proportionality test applicable 
in cases related to the national identity clause. The underlying argument 
would hence be the possible application of a less stringent proportionality 
test in reviewing national measures that according to the Member State are 
part of their national identity.
196
 While the principle of proportionality cuts 
corners, the margin of appreciation sets frames. Simplifying, the national 
identities of the Member States, within the frames set by the margin of 
appreciation, would be given a space to breath, rather than being shaped and 
adjusted by the principle of proportionality.  
 
The argument does not fall far from the ECJ’s reasoning in Sayn-
Wittgenstein. The ECJ rather laconically noted the following in paragraph 
93: 
 
“[...] By refusing to recognise the noble elements of a name such as that of the 
applicant in the main proceedings, the Austrian authorities responsible for civil 
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status matters do not appear to have gone further than is necessary in order to ensure 
the attainment of the fundamental constitutional objective pursued by them.”
 197
 
 
Thus, the ECJ only superficially examined whether the national provision 
was proportionate, giving the Member State a broad margin of appreciation. 
The proportionality test used in Sayn-Wittgenstein hence differs 
significantly from the recent Sky Österreich case where, tough not a national 
identity case, national constitutional provisions did come into play. As 
mentioned, the ECJ went through all three stages of the proportionality test, 
including proportionality strictu sensu.
198
 
 
Although no significant conclusion can be drawn from merely two cases, 
both Sayn-Wittgenstein and Sky Österreich offer a possible suggestion to 
how the margin of appreciation could affect the proportionality test in 
national identity cases. First, as regards Sky Österreich and the fact that the 
ECJ applied all three stages of the proportionality test, it should be stressed 
that the case was one within the harmonized field of EU law. A national 
identity would seemingly not fall into that category.
199
 As a result, the last 
step of the principle of proportionality would presumably not apply to a 
provision falling under Article 4.2 TEU. Recalling that the national identity 
has strong ties with the principle of subsidiarity, it would furthermore seem 
almost ill suited for the ECJ to perform an actual weighing of the interests at 
stake in a national identity case.  
 
As to Sayn-Wittgenstein, although the ECJ stated that the Austrian 
authorities did not appear to have gone further than necessary, it is hard to 
find an examination of the necessity test in the court’s reasoning. This 
seemingly leads to the conclusion that while the test of suitability will 
always be present, the margin of appreciation particularly strikes at the 
second test of the principle of proportionality, i.e. the test of necessity. The 
test of necessity states that a state action cannot go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain the objective pursued. It is precisely here that national 
identities might cause a problem. In Omega, the national identity manifested 
itself by banning all articles related to the game Laserdrome. In Michaniki, it 
manifested itself by placing a bar on all tenderers involved in the media 
sector from participating in public procurement contracts. While the ECJ 
found the provision proportionate in Omega – the provision prohibited only 
the variant of the laser game with the object to fire on human targets – it did 
not find the provision proportionate in Michaniki. The provision bared all 
tenderers irrespective of whether their connection to the media sector was 
only marginal. The provision in Michaniki was thus manifestly 
disproportionate. The possibility of applying a proportionality test with a 
higher threshold as regards the test of necessity would therefore be a 
plausible suggestion on how the margin of appreciation would influence the 
principle of proportionality within cases on national identity. Such a test 
would allow the Member States the sufficient space to adjust their 
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constitutional specificities with the objectives of the Union. Alas, as stated 
by the ECJ in Omega “it was not its intention, [...], to formulate a general 
criterion for assessing the proportionality of any national measure which 
restricts the exercise of an economic activity.”200 It would thus be highly 
surprising to see the ECJ actually clarifying how the test of proportionality 
should be applied in relation to the margin of appreciation.  
 
Although the margin of appreciation, as discussed, may influence the test of 
proportionality within cases on national identities, one cannot deviate from 
the fact that the national identity clause is not an absolute right. As stated by 
Maduro in Michaniki the preservation of national identities can only be 
allowed within certain limits. It is therefore a discussion on which 
proportionality test should be applied, and never one of whether a 
proportionality test should be applied at all.  
5.3.2 Guidance Judgments Rather than Ready-
Made Solutions 
The second suggestion follows the ECJ’s approach in Wardyn. As opposed 
to all other national identity cases the ECJ in Wardyn did not give a ready-
made solution, but left it up to the national court to “decide whether such 
refusal reflects a fair balance between the interests in issue.”201 While the 
ECJ hence set the frames, it left a margin of flexibility for the national court, 
committing to a sort of “national court’s right to assessment” 202.  
 
A national court’s right to assessment fits well with a national identity 
clause granting Member States a margin of appreciation, if recalling that the 
margin of appreciation doctrine stems from the principle of subsidiarity. The 
close connection between the national identity clause and the principle of 
subsidiarity itself further strengthens the argument. While the ECJ 
necessarily needs to set the frames of any action brought within the ambit of 
Article 4.2 TEU as a provision of EU law, the national courts are best suited 
to examine the facts of the case in light of their constitutional provisions. 
Maduro has similarly stressed the importance of allowing Member States an 
increased discretion when there are possible conflicts of constitutional 
law.
203
 “Those authorities [constitutional courts] are best placed to define 
the constitutional identity of the Member States which the European Union 
has undertaken to respect.”204 Furthermore, as noted in recent case-law, the 
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ECJ is not adverse to the possibility of merely giving guidance judgments, 
even if ready-made solutions are much more frequent.
205
  
5.4 National Identity and Public Policy 
The concept of public policy is, as mentioned, wide and can be filled with 
many different values. Nevertheless, any public policy derogation needs to 
address a real and sufficient serious danger and protect a fundamental 
interest of society. What is then the protection of a Member States national 
identity if not one addressing those precise circumstances? It is perhaps no 
coincident that the two most famous cases on national identity also happen 
to be cases on public policy. While not all provisions falling under the 
derogation of public policy will constitute a national identity, most 
provisions that are part of the Member State’s national identity will however 
constitute a public policy derogation. This is further supported by reading 
Article 4.2 TEU as a whole. The last part of Article 4.2 TEU mentions that 
the Union shall respect the essential state functions of the Member States 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In that regard, 
one might view the national identity clause simply as a codified expression 
of public policy.  
 
The public policy aspect is even present within the line of cases where the 
identity clause has been relied on as an autonomous ground for derogation. 
In Wardyn, Advocate General Jääskinen recalls that case-law with regard to 
language requirements holds that the possible justifications for such 
obstacles “implies [...] the existence of legitimate aims relating to 
considerations of public policy”206.  
 
Public policy often comes hand in hand with a margin of appreciation for 
the Member State. As such, there is a triangular relationship between the 
national identity clause, public policy and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. They are all linked to each other. This begs the question of 
whether the national identity clause primarily is a political tool rather than a 
legal one. If national identities already are well protected under the 
derogation of public policy, what is then the contribution of Article 4.2 
TEU? Considering the fact that the ECJ, in all cases where the identity 
clause has been used as an aid in interpreting existing grounds for 
derogation, has been brief and laconic in its reference to Article 4.2 TEU the 
answer could well be that its contribution is primarily of a political nature. 
In light of the fact that the clause also has been used as an autonomous 
ground for derogation, that answer can however not be acceptable. While it 
is the former line of case-law that has attracted the most attention from 
scholars, it is nevertheless the latter that confirms the legal character of the 
national identity clause. 
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Another interesting facet of the discussion is the fact that the ECJ has stated 
that the purpose of the public policy exception is not to reserve certain 
matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States. This might 
suggest that the national identity clause brings something new to the 
equation and in theory is wider than the concept of public policy. The fact 
that public policy primarily is present as regards the fundamental freedoms, 
while the national identity clause is present within the entire spectrum of EU 
law, points in the same direction.   
5.5 National Identity and the Principle of 
Primacy 
Both the CC and the FCC have firmly stated that they hold the ultimate say 
in issues on the compatibility of EU law with their respective constitutions. 
The latest step in their perseverance is the identity review introduced by 
both courts. This has further eroded the rationale established by the ECJ in 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, where the ECJ confirmed the primacy 
of EU law over national constitutional provisions. And as reason stands, it 
would render the national identity clause void of any judicial relevance if 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft would be seen as an absolute bar to the 
prevalence of national constitutional rules over EU law. How are national 
identities to be respected if EU law automatically prevails over national 
constitutions? As noted, the ECJ is today, however, far beyond the position 
it took in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. The court has on several 
occasions referred to the relevance of national constitutional aspects in order 
to justify exceptions from EU law.
207
 Still, Melloni is a sharp reminder of 
the fact that the primacy of EU law permeates the entire national legal 
system, including national constitutions. This is obviously necessary as the 
uniform and effective application of Union law otherwise would be 
jeopardized. As argued, and as noted by Advocate General Bot in Melloni, 
Article 4.2 TEU nevertheless offers the last safe house for the constitutional 
specificities of the Member States. The difficulty hence lies in finding the 
right balance between the primacy of EU law and national identities. 
5.5.1 Striking the Right Balance 
5.5.1.1 The Peculiarities of the National Identity Clause 
One of the most interesting aspects of Advocate General Bot’s opinion in 
Melloni, is the fact that he states that the national identity clause may be 
relied upon against a provision of secondary law. It is interesting since the 
ECJ so far never has held that Member States can derogate from secondary 
law on the basis of Article 4.2 TEU.
208
 It is however a logical conclusion. If 
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Article 4.2 TEU can be used against a treaty based obligation, why should it 
then not be applicable to an obligation stemming from secondary EU law? If 
one understands the national identity clause as the last safe house for the 
national constitutional specificities of the Member States, there is no reason 
why the respect for national identities should be narrowed to Treaty based 
provisions only.  
 
Another interesting aspect Melloni raises is the difference Article 4.2 TEU 
creates between normal constitutional provisions and constitutional 
provisions considered to be part of a Member State’s national identity. As 
noted by Besselink, only constitutional provisions which are part of the 
Member States’ national identity will have a privileged position vis-á-vis 
EU-law.
209
 The ECJ never acknowledged Michaniki as a national identity 
case, and perhaps this is the reason why, though finding the contested 
provision justified, the outcome differed from Omega and Sayn-
Wittgenstein.
210
  
 
Taking it one step further, might there then be a difference between 
constitutional provisions considered as national identities per se? Is there 
heavier and lighter national identities, which in return offer a different 
degree of protection? Some argue, “it stands to reason that the greater the 
infringement of national identity might be, the greater the justification on 
the part of the European Union should be for not respecting the expression 
of such constitutional individuality.”211 This is necessarily not so for three 
reasons.  
 
First, Article 4.2 TEU speaks of fundamental structures, implying that, as 
already argued, national identities are narrower than constitutional law as a 
whole. It would undermine the essence of national identities as fundamental 
constitutional rules if those fundamental rules could be divided into less 
fundamental and more fundamental. Consequently, the thought that there 
are different levels of national identities implies a conception of what 
constitutes a national identity that is too wide to begin with.  
 
Second, the argument necessarily leads to the suggestion that there are some 
national identities so fundamental and essential that no proportionality test 
at all should be applied, an outcome which does not go hand in hand with 
EU law.  
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Third, the question addresses the inherent paradox in the national identity 
clause. While Article 4.2 TEU cannot be interpreted by itself, it at the same 
needs to be examined in its own light. In other words, national identities are 
always linked with a particular interest, be it human dignity, the right to a 
fair trial, language requirements etc. While these might require a greater 
justification on the part of the Union, Article 4.2 TEU should preferably not 
be divided into national identities and national identities. This would 
infringe the principle of equality between the Member States in Article 4.2 
TEU.  
 
One last aspect Melloni raises is whether there should be a difference in the 
application of the national identity clause depending on whether it appears 
within an exclusive or non-exclusive area of EU law. That is, should there in 
cases on national identity that appear, no matter how unlikely, within the 
exclusive competence of the Union be a more stringent proportionality test 
vis-á-vis that national identity? Reading Advocate General Bot’s opinion in 
Melloni, stating Article 4.2 TEU can be used to derogate from secondary 
law, suggests that the answer is yes. In line with the doctrine of pre-
emption, an area harmonized through for instance a directive, may be 
considered as becoming an exclusive area of EU law. Bot’s opinion may 
therefore be interpreted as implying that the national identity clause should 
have the same effect within exclusive areas of EU law, as within non-
exclusive areas of EU law. This interpretation is supported if recalling that 
the rationale behind the national identity clause is to bar Union law from 
encroaching upon Member States’ core constitutional rules, and that the 
identity clause as such signifies a commitment to the principle of 
conferral.
212
 One must however observe the difference between a provision 
falling within the scope of a harmonized area, and one addressing a 
particular interest harmonized in that area. An interest harmonized within 
EU law means the Union has set both the floor and ceiling on how that 
interest should be understood, and it would hence presumably be difficult to 
apply the national identity clause to that particular interest.
213
 This can be 
seen in Melloni since the ECJ in paragraphs 60 and 61 noted that Article 53 
of the Charter could not apply as the European Arrest Warrant particularly 
states that it does “not allow Member States to refuse to execute a European 
arrest warrant when the person concerned is in one of the situations 
provided for therein”.214 As that interest hence was harmonized, the primacy 
of EU law prevailed.  
 
5.5.1.2 A Balanced Relationship 
In respect of the above mentioned, it should be kept in mind that any 
conflict between the national identities of the Member States and the Union 
in general would be exceptional as both the Union as the Member States in 
essence stand on the same principles, e.g. Article 2 TEU. The same 
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conclusion can also be derived from the Solange judgments of the FCC. The 
FCC there stated that Union law, in general, offers the same protection to 
fundamental rights as the German basic law. Thus, it will only review EU 
law as long as the Union and ECJ maintain the same level of protection 
essentially equivalent to the Basic Law. As a result, when conflicts do rise, a 
balanced relationship between the national identity clause and the principle 
of primacy must be sought. As argued throughout this paper, the national 
identity clause stands in contrast to an absolute principle of primacy. At the 
same time, national identities are not absolute in themselves either. A 
margin of appreciation within the context of national identities might help in 
striking the right balance between the two. Two comments should be made 
in this regard. 
 
First, the two notions do not need to be seen as opposites. They can be 
understood as running parallel to each other, neither encroaching upon the 
other. Incorporating the margin of appreciation doctrine into the national 
identity clause allows the national specificities of the Member States a 
margin of flexibility within the overarching principle of primacy.  
 
Second, it would be an oxymoron to see the principle of primacy absolute. If 
it would overcome even the national identities of the Member States, it 
chops of the branch it sits on. This is at least the outcome if understood from 
a Member State perspective, since the Member States see the principle of 
primacy as stemming from their national constitutions.  
 
5.5.2 The Primacy, Unity and Effectiveness of 
EU Law 
Though the importance of national identities and the national identity clause 
cannot be underestimated, one should at the same time be careful with 
overvaluing them. The Union needs to find a solution to the tension between 
national constitutions and Union law, and Article 4.2 TEU seen as a 
flexibility clause offers that solution. In that regard, the national identity 
clause is the pillar on which a Union embracing the notion of constitutional 
pluralism can be built upon. Again, the right balance however needs to be 
struck. Unravelling the potential of the national identity clause unavoidably 
weakens the effective and uniform application of EU law. As seen in 
Melloni, regarding Article 53 of the Charter, there exists, and with good 
reason, an underlying fear with interpreting articles jeopardizing the 
principle of primacy too far. As stated by the ECJ “national authorities and 
courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental 
rights, provided that [...] the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are 
not thereby compromised.”215 Hence, while the national identity clause 
offers the last safe house for national constitutional specificities, it is not 
without good reason the ECJ so far has been scarce in applying it.  
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Even if the application of Article 4.2 TEU is exceptional, it will still find 
ways to express itself in EU-27. 27 national constitutions under one Union 
law will inevitably trigger the application of the identity clause irrespective 
of how careful the ECJ is with referring to it. Consequently, while the 
application of Article 4.2 TEU will weaken the uniform application of EU 
law, the ECJ will need to shape the national identity clause as to address the 
tension between national constitutions and Union law. 
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6 Conclusion 
The ECJ has so far been modest in applying and making reference to the 
national identity clause. Its latent potential would presumably be the reason 
for this. At the same time, its elusive character might be another 
explanation. The ECJ has so far mainly used it in two different ways, as an 
autonomous ground for derogation and as an aid in interpreting existing 
grounds for derogation. However, its political nature cannot be excluded all 
together. One might also suggest that the national identity clause is a general 
principle of EU law. This paper stands on the thesis that the national identity 
clause should be understood as a flexibility clause granting Member States a 
margin of appreciation. As such, the national constitutional specificities of 
the Member States will be able to shine through in harmony with the 
Union’s dictum United in Diversity. Borrowing the quote by Sir. Waldock 
Humphrey, Article 4.2 TEU might have the potential to reconcile the 
“effective operation of the [European Union] with the sovereign powers and 
responsibilities of governments in a democracy.”216 
 
Two points will seemingly always remain ambiguous as regards Article 4.2 
TEU. The first one concerns its relationship with the principle of primacy. Is 
the primary purpose of the national identity clause to function as the 
counterweight to the absolute primacy of EU law, or do they run parallel to 
each other? While the question presumably never will be answered, the ECJ 
needs to clarify the purpose and legal implications of the national identity 
clause, as it weakens the Union to have such a significant article covered in 
mystery. 
 
The second point concerns the principle of proportionality. Notwithstanding 
the fact that it is hard to pinpoint its application as used in case-law in 
relation to Article 4.2 TEU, its application to Article 4.2 TEU as a flexibility 
clause offers additional challenges. If anything, the proportionality test 
suggested in section 5.3.1 precisely highlights those difficulties.  
 
EU-27 means 27 constitutions and hence 27 different national identities. 
These will all need to find their place within the Union context. Article 4.2 
TEU seen as a flexibility clause granting Member States a margin of 
appreciation is one suggestion on how that can be accomplished. Article 4.2 
TEU might however never fully rise to the latent potential it inherently has. 
Seen as a flexibility clause, easing the friction between the Union legal 
order and national constitutional provisions, it might nonetheless lead to a 
Union not only United in Diversity, but United through Diversity.   
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